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In the global field of antitrust law, policy paradigms are pushed and 
pulled by forces analogous to those of the market. Policy entrepreneurs 
(typically competition law agencies) operate in a setting where, 
notwithstanding various cooperative platforms, competition and rivalry 
occur and manifest themselves in a number of dimensions. This article is 
thus premised on the notion that competition enforcers across 
jurisdictions compete among themselves on a global ‘market’. It ventures 
beyond extant scholarship by elaborating more fully on the modes 
through which this competitive behavior is pursued. The primary 
competitive relationship explored is that between enforcers in the United 
States and enforcers in the European Union, but the article also accounts 
for antitrust having ‘gone global’, with the multiplication of antitrust 
jurisdictions and thus new entrants around the world. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Competitive Forces in Global Antitrust Enforcement 
By rough analogy to other fields of activity, in the world of competition law, 
competition authorities and competition law systems compete for what may 
loosely be termed market share.1 With competition law, while notional degrees of 
market share defy precise measurement, we might take as an imperfect proxy 
certain observed isomorphic processes. Isomorphism should not necessarily be 
understood as mimicry; actual and potential “buyers” of concepts and paradigms 
may be sophisticated enough to absorb attractive ideas by way of a self-regarding 
selective adaptation and vernacularization that partly or fully takes account of 
local needs and other constraints such as the cultural infrastructure and political 
(and political economy) constraints, as well as institutional resources, 
(in)capacities and (dys)functions. A “transaction” can thus occur not only where 
an isomorphic shift is purely mimetic but also where the shift is a matter of 
degree or hybridization. Occasionally, exported ideas fail to take root in foreign 
soil. They may have no chance to flourish due to resource/capacity constraints 
and weak institutions and enforcement; or there may be a mismatch between 
elite-level approximation or replication of foreign solutions and a country’s 
cultural/multi-cultural norms or shifting political currents. And in the end, an 
 
1. Foreign competition law approaches imposed on Latin American countries, largely as part of 
conditional loan packages, illustrate how the leveraging of paradigms can backfire. See generally COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 9-11 (Eleanor Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009); Julian Peña, 
Competition Policies in Latin America, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC ANTITRUST 732 
(Philip Marsden ed., 2006). 
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injudicious transaction may breed contempt, which may have far-reaching 
consequences.2 
From the perspective of the “merchants” and “peddlers,”3 the more they can 
stimulate isomorphic processes, the easier it will be to achieve greater degrees of 
substantive, procedural, institutional and intellectual convergence across 
jurisdictions.4 This objective dovetails with that of gaining, as it were, a large 
share of the market. Attentive observers have cautioned that convergence is not 
to be pursued as an inherently desirable goal; relative costs, risks and benefits as 
well as capacities should be taken into account along with the particular 
contextual fabric of the jurisdiction or group of jurisdictions that may be 
interested in making a “purchase.”5 One risk may be that a foreign-spawned tool 
or principle, which may be based on a chain of possibly contingent choices, 
could exacerbate pre-existing problems. For example, a green light for territorial 
restrictions agreed between non-competitors, which flashed on in the United 
States in the late 1970s, was deemed inapposite in the European context, where 
markets across the Continent tended to be, and in many cases still are, highly 
fragmented (and not only because of enlargements to the East).6 Another risk 
 
2. The backlash and shift toward socialism is described in more political terms in Jorge G. Castañeda, 
Latin America’s Left Turn, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May-June 2006), available at http://sandovalhernandezj.people. 
cofc.edu/r21.pdf. The impediments to successful transplants, and the importance of adequate pre-conditions, 
have been highlighted in a substantial corpus of literature. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-
François Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003); 
Tay-Cheng Ma, Legal Transplant, Legal Origin, and Antitrust Effectiveness, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 65 
(2013). See also FRANZ KRONTHALER, IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW IN DEVELOPING AND 
TRANSITION COUNTRIES 89-90 (2007). Diffusion as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon is discussed in 
William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 1 J. COMP. L. 237 (2004); William Twining, Social 
Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J. L. SOC’Y 203 (2005). For a legal anthropology perspective, see Julia Eckert, 
Who is Afraid of Legal Transfers?, in ORDER FROM TRANSFER: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND 
LEGAL CULTURE 171 (Günter Frankenberg ed., 2013). 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. Cf. DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION 278 (2010). 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. The distinct, historically determined structure of the European economy is a factor relevant not just to 
vertical restraints doctrine but to other areas of the law, as well as the application of Article 102 TFEU. For 
example, fragmented markets may hinder the process of creative destruction or similar self-corrective 
mechanisms. Cf. Gustatvo Ghidini & Emanuela Arezzo, La prospettiva costituzionale della tutela della 
concorrenza [A Constitutional Perspective on the Protection of Competition], in ALLE FRONTIERE DEL DIRITTO 
COSTITUZIONALE: SCRITTI IN ONORE DI VALERIA ONIDA [AT THE FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF VALERIA ONIDA] 859, 871 (Marilisa D’Amico & Barbara Randazzo eds., 2011) (Europe 
“thus appears reluctant to entrust the protection of competition to a merely potential perspective [. . .]”) 
(translation and emphasis are by the author of this article; the term ‘potential’ refers to pressures from potential 
competition). See also John Vickers, Competition Law and Economics: A Mid-Atlantic Viewpoint, 3 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 1, 6 (2007) (“competitive self-righting mechanisms” in Europe may be less robust as compared 
to the U.S. because of Europe’s history of extensively monopolized markets, largely as a result of government 
intervention). Vickers also tentatively raises the point that, since Europe had not developed its private 
enforcement capacities to any degree comparable to the enormous litigation apparatus in the U.S. (a gap the EU 
is gradually and timidly addressing, although positive developments mainly concern only business-to-business 
litigation), more rigorous standards for unilateral conduct in Europe may be less apt to inhibit desirable 
aggressive competition on the part of dominant firms. See id. 
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may be harm to competition law’s perceived legitimacy if a particular form of 
competition law is pushed too hard on a culture deeply rooted in different prior 
beliefs and values.7 The un-reflexive assumption that convergence between 
systems, concepts and analytical approaches is desirable for its own sake has 
therefore understandably been criticized.8 An additional critique that has been 
aired is that if convergence were adopted by all actors and jurisdictions as an 
 
7. See Thomas Cheng, Convergence and Its Discontents: A Reconsideration of the Merits of Convergence 
of Global Competition Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 433, 489 (2012) (advocating culturally sensitive convergence, 
and not opposing convergence as such). According to Cheng, the risk is linked to the relative permanence of 
local cultural values, which do not change fundamentally despite forces of globalization. In this regard, he cites 
Ronald Inglehart & Wayne Baker, Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values, 
65 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 19, 21-22 (2000). At page 22, Inglehart and Baker write: “Weber [in THE PROTESTANT 
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1904)] argued that traditional religious values have an enduring 
influence on the institutions of a society. Following this tradition, Huntington [in THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996)] argues that the world is divided into eight major civilizations or 
‘cultural zones’ based on cultural [and specifically, religious] differences that have persisted for centuries. [. . .] 
Scholars from various disciplines have observed that distinctive cultural traits endure over long periods of time 
and continue to shape a society’s political and economic performance. For example, Putnam [in MAKING 
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993)] shows that the regions of Italy in which 
democratic institutions function most successfully today are those in which civil society was relatively well 
developed in the nineteenth century and even earlier. Fukuyama [in TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE 
CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995)] argues that a cultural heritage of ‘low-trust’ puts a society at a competitive 
disadvantage in global markets because it is less able to develop large and complex social institutions. Hamilton 
[in ‘Civilizations and Organization of Economies’, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 183 (Smelser 
& Sedberg eds., 1994)] argues that, although capitalism has become an almost universal way of life, 
civilizational factors continue to structure the organization of economies and societies: ‘What we witness with 
the development of a global economy is not increasing uniformity, in the form of a universalization of Western 
culture, but rather the continuation of civilizational diversity through the active reinvention and reincorporation 
of non-Western civilizational patterns’ (p. 184).” Cheng would nevertheless likely agree that although culture is 
slow to change and path dependencies tend to be durable, it does not follow that efforts to engender a 
“competition culture” are futile. Mindful of the point made by Inglehart and Baker, expectations and strategies 
of social change should be realistic and, to the extent possible, harmonious with the logic and philosophy of a 
particular “cultural zone.” Furthermore, with respect to the developing world, some recommended “building 
blocks” have been identified by, e.g., Sokol and Stephan: “In order to build competition culture, competition 
authorities must choose their cases carefully so as to maximize positive media coverage, information 
dissemination, and interest by ordinary members of the public. Bid-rigging cases [which most taxpayers can 
avidly applaud] may be a good place to start.” D. Daniel Sokol & Andreas Stephan, Prioritizing Cartel 
Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 137, 153 
(D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). Sequencing, strategic planning, and the 
identification of genuine shared interests thus become avenues to dissolving or at least softening cultural 
barriers, rather than trying to break through them. 
8. For broader discussion of the advantages and risks of participation in global convergence, see generally 
Cheng, supra note 7. For discussion of the rhetoric and mechanisms of convergence and a variety of 
impediments to it, see GERBER supra note 4, at 281-292. Within the specific context of competition laws and 
enforcement patterns in the European Union, the convergence process has rather unique dynamics which set it 
apart from the subject of global convergence. See, e.g., Laurence Idot, Réflexions sur la convergence des droits 
de la concurrence [Reflections on the convergence of competition laws], November 2012, 4-2012 
CONCURRENCE http://www.concurrences.com/Journal/Issues/No-4-2012/Articles-1371/The-convergence-of-
competition. 
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overriding goal, desirable innovation might be suppressed.9 Kerber and Budzinski 
therefore plead for diversity and experimentation as part of a discovery procedure 
needed to address Hayek’s problem of constitutional ignorance.10 
Furthermore, even supposing convergence were desirable, as things stand 
today there are some areas of law (abuse of dominance in particular) in which 
differences in objectives, implementation capabilities and institutions appear to 
preclude the identification of any truly universal approach and thus render the 
convergence enterprise, even as between developed countries let alone the rest of 
the world, largely illusory.11 
Taking account of the risks, drawbacks and in some cases the 
impracticability of convergence, and particularly where the “country of import” 
is a developing or least developed country, its historical-cultural, social and 
economic conditions may be so different that they are advised to be eclectic with 
their choices, and to “develop their own brand of competition law, resisting 
pressures to copy ‘international standards’ without regard to fit.”12 As noted later, 
some of them are following this advice.13 Meanwhile, starting from somewhat 
different, or rather overlapping, premises—and responding to the counter-risk 
that this recommended diversity might lead to excessive fragmentation—one of 
the catch phrases circulating in recent years has been “informed divergence.”14 
 
9. Cf. Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible?, in 
COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 35-36 (Michael 
Greve & Richard Epstein eds., 2004). 
10. Id. at 36-39, 55 (Hayekian “knowledge problem requires that an international system of competition 
laws must sustainably produce variety and generate new knowledge”); See also OLIVER BUDZINSKI, THE 
GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION: COMPETENCE ALLOCATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
POLICY 72-80 (2008); Wolfgang Kerber, The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law, in 
ECONOMIC LAW AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD: ITS RULE FUNCTION AND ITS TOOL FUNCTION IN THE COMPETITION 
OF SYSTEMS 27 (Karl Meessen ed., 2009). 
11. See generally Giorgio Monti, Unilateral Conduct: The Search for Global Standards, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 345 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012). 
12. Eleanor Fox, Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a Competition Law 
Fit for Developing Countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 273, 273 (Josef Drexl, Mor Bakhoum, Eleanor Fox, Michal Gal & David Gerber eds., 2012). Fox 
recognizes that an internal evaluation, sensitive to local conditions and needs, may lead a jurisdiction to 
conclude that the benefits of copying or otherwise embracing a global standard outweigh the disadvantages. But 
she stresses the importance of making an informed choice. See id. at 286, 290; see also Eleanor M. Fox and 
Michal S. Gal, Drafting Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience (New York 
Univ. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 14-11), forthcoming in ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING 
JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexl, Mor Bakhoum, Eleanor Fox, 
Michal Gal & David Gerber eds., 2015) (need for eclectic, tailored solutions). The costs and benefits to be 
considered by a developing country when deciding whether to move closer to a competition model based on 
neoclassical economics are discussed in detail by GERBER, supra note 4, at 13. 
13. See discussion infra at section III.D.4. 
14. Strictly speaking, and as originally used, “informed divergence” operates at the level of the diverging 
actor, which (as highlighted particularly in footnote 12 and accompanying text) should be making well-
informed choices about whether to follow global standards. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 287, 374 (1997). The popularity 
of the term ‘informed divergence’ stems from Slaughter’s later use of it in ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW 
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This reference to divergence may in reality be a long-term convergence 
strategy.15 But it is a “soft” strategy that allows for flexibility, which is meant in 
part to be a pressure valve enabling the convergence process to advance.16 The 
concept of informed divergence seems to exhibit an inherent tension that is 
unlikely ever to be fully resolved, even if such full resolution were desirable. It is 
not inconceivable that one day we may see a move from markets toward 
hierarchies or quasi-hierarchies: some form of top-down (and partial) 
harmonization in some areas of competition law may occur. Such a development 
would substantially change the character of discussions about convergence, and 
the locus of debate might then shift to processes of splintering and drift. But most 
would agree that top-down global harmonization of broad scope, e.g., via a WTO 
framework agreement or via some new international institution, will not happen 
in the foreseeable future.17 For some, this is just as well.18 
 
WORLD ORDER 24, 172 (2004). However, the term is helpfully also used ‘multilaterally’ to imply that the 
relevant community of interest is or should be equally informed of, and that it understands or should 
understand, the divergence and the reasons for it. Cf. John Fingleton, Competition Agencies and Global 
Markets: the Challenges Ahead, Speech Given as Part of the Mellon Sawyer Seminar Series (June 5, 2009), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2009/spe0909paper.pdf, at 27. Of course, if no brakes 
were applied to the informed divergence concept, then the risk of unraveling would rear its head again, but the 
group dynamics of the ICN tend to serve as a buffer against disintegrative tendencies. 
15. Fingleton refers to the “interplay” between convergence and informed divergence. He also seems to 
assume that divergent approaches will ultimately be phased out, in particular when developing economies reach 
a certain stage of development. See Fingleton, supra note 14 at 27 (specifically, points 87 and 90). For the 
notion that informed divergence is intended to lay the groundwork for possible long-term convergence, see 
Eleanor Fox, John Fingleton and Sophie Mitchell, The Past and Future of International Antitrust: Gaps, 
Overlaps and the Institutional Challenge, in BUILDING NEW COMPETITION REGIMES: SELECTED ESSAYS 163 
(David Lewis ed., 2013), at section V of the chapter. The interplay between convergence and divergence has 
also been noted by other authors. See, e.g., Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case 
Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 246 (2003). 
16. A flexible margin for divergence is, of course, a reflection of the global preference, thus far, for soft 
law solutions and soft institutions. In some cases, it may be that the divergence is not easily discerned from an 
external point of view, as it emerges through a more subtle process of adaptation. Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, 
International Antitrust Institutions, in COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY 187, 196 (Andrew 
Guzman ed., 2011) (“In soft law antitrust, broad principles in antitrust allow for each country to adopt the 
language and theoretical underpinnings behind it in a manner that can be more easily incorporated within the 
existing legal and political traditions. This flexibility allows for ‘fit’ within an existing tradition and is not a 
pure transplant across legal systems . . . “). If broad principles are adopted with the possibility to frame them 
within different theoretical perspectives, then a degree of divergence seems likely given high degrees of 
heterogeneity across a large number of jurisdictions and “culture zones.” That is to say, “informed divergence” 
may be a strategy of managed convergence but at the same time it is a conceptual description of what may be an 
endemic feature of the international system when hard obligations have not been undertaken. 
17. See, e.g., Fingleton, supra note 14, at 18; D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger 
Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1099 (2010); DANIEL CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 229 (2011). Crane suggests laying a foundation for plurilateral or multilateral hard 
law gradually and issue-by-issue, beginning with procedure and progressing to substance and institutions. His 
example is pre-merger notification, which could be standardized as a step toward a treaty on substantive merger 
norms. See CRANE, supra at 243. On the need for hard law solutions for certain issue-specific challenges, see 
also infra note 58. 
18. One risk with a multilateral consensus-based agreement is to get stuck with a bad deal that can’t 
feasibly be reversed, although a carefully crafted agreement might provide for a workable solution by its own 
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While convergence is often a central point of emphasis in the modern global 
antitrust conversation and cannot be ignored, the present article develops a 
related but different theme: the interest here is on the supply side, and the drive to 
increase market share, which may perhaps also be interpreted as the drive to 
project soft power, to borrow Joseph Nye’s popular term.19 In this context, the 
self-interest of key actors, in a broad sense, is not the whole story, but it plays a 
central role.20 Another related dynamic at play is the distorted lens through which 
many if not all of us see the world, a lens of self-certified enlightenment. Many 
American antitrust lawyers seem predisposed to the sentiment that they 
understand antitrust in a privileged way; after all, the U.S. was the undisputed 
antitrust heavyweight champion for 70 years until the 1960s finally witnessed the 
incipient influence of competition authorities in Bonn and Brussels. In Europe, 
meanwhile, many at some level hold to the view that while competition law 
principles and antitrust-type analytical tools took longer to develop in Europe, 
lawyers there have surpassed the Americans in competition enlightenment, for 
example because in Europe there is a somewhat richer history of competition law 
ideas from which to draw. At least some European competition experts may feel 
that while Chicago, or an alloyed version of Chicago, has been the slow death of 
American antitrust, Europe has largely escaped this fate, and that even in the age 
of the more economic approach (thought by many to be a post- or anti-
ordoliberal approach with de-ethicizing overtones), it is the EU competition law 
regime that keeps an otherwise largely unaccountable global industry honest.21 
 
terms. Apart from this, some argue that global hard law is in fact undesirable and inferior to the voluntary 
system of soft convergence and cooperation that has developed in the last dozen years. See Anu Bradford, 
International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes, in COOPERATION, COMITY 
AND COMPETITION POLICY 319, 343 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2010) (“First, as cooperation under nonbinding 
agreements is largely self-enforcing, the added value of a binding agreement with provisions for monitoring, 
enforcement, and sanctions is trivial. Second, in the absence of coordinated domestic interest group support for 
international antitrust cooperation, a binding agreement would not provide states with any domestic political 
economy rents and therefore will remain a low national priority. Finally, the emerging voluntary convergence 
will slowly eradicate negative externalities stemming from decentralized antitrust regimes, making the case for 
a binding international agreement less compelling.”). 
19. See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (2005). 
20. The term “self-interest” is not primarily a reference to national welfare- or budget-maximizing 
strategies, or profit-shifting in the sense of strategic trade theory. A government (and/or legislator) may well be 
guided by such strategies, and if it (they) can (openly or subtly) dictate the policies of the competition authority 
established in the jurisdiction concerned, the authority would no doubt act self-interestedly in this narrow sense 
as well. Similarly, a competition authority may be co-opted directly by (globally active) commercial interests. 
Without denying these possibilities, the reference to self-interest in the main text is concerned with a wider 
range of motivations including, for example, the desire to achieve prestige and gain influence in a global 
community of interest, and to respond to or anticipate competitive pressures generated by the activities of rival 
authorities engaged in a similar game. These motivations seem particularly relevant where and to the extent that 
competition authorities engaged in the global promotion of their own competition law regimes operate with 
relative independence from globalized industry and from other organs of government. 
21. A side note here is that, by its own terms, a “more economic approach” is not an ‘exclusively 
economic approach’ (which probably cannot be practiced even in the U.S., not least because subtextual content 
will always seep into competition law as conceived or as applied, as it can do in practically all areas of law). 
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The theme here, then, is the conscious/unconscious will to compete for 
influence via the diffusion of ideas, paradigms, techniques, norm and institution 
design, and so on. The term “competition” may fail to capture the simultaneous 
cooperative efforts made among competition authorities, and in this sense the 
alternative term “co-opetition” could be used.22 However, with some exceptions 
the emphasis in this text is on competition and not cooperation; since the co-
opetitive dimensions are not explored in detail, this terminology is not used 
either. 
With regard to competition among competition authorities, the aim is not to 
set out to prove that such competition produces good results, as it tends to do in 
most real markets.23 Previous work suggests that “yardstick” competition among 
competition law institutions (as opposed to the usual Tieboutian competition 
among legislators analyzed in most discussions of regulatory competition, where 
regulatees/voters can relocate or otherwise select laws) will indeed tend, in 
general, to be welfare-enhancing.24 This is a sensible view; it seems quite 
improbable that adequate agency self-improvement could take place in the 
absence of competitive forces. I take the desirability of such yardstick 
competition as a given and do no more than conduct an indicative survey of the 
modes in which competition authorities compete globally through their activities. 
 
Giorgio Monti has commented on this, explaining that “there are good reasons for the Commission to insist in 
its public communications that its approach is only about using more economics, because contemporary EC 
competition law is governed by: a distributive concern about ensuring consumer welfare (which is very difficult 
to implement in certain instances); other non-economic values; a policy choice (at present at least) in favor of 
efficiency in the short term over long term dynamic efficiencies; and a wish to see the law enforced to protect 
the process of competition.” Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law: The Dominance of Economic Analysis?, in 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 12-13 (Roger Zäch, Andreas Heinemann 
& Andreas Kellerhals eds. 2010) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Later in the text we return to consider 
further the last of Monti’s themes, the protection of the “process of competition.” 
22. See Daniel Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 235 (2000); 
Damien Geradin & Joseph McCahery, Regulatory Co-opetition: Transcending the Regulatory Competition 
Debate, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF 
GOVERNANCE 90, 93 (Jacinta Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004) (“a flexible mix of competition and 
cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between governmental and non-governmental actors”). 
The regulatory co-opetition perspective does not require a mix of competition and cooperation. It is a broad 
framework that accommodates pure competition, pure cooperation, and combinations of the two. 
23. See Kerber & Budzinski, supra note 9, at 31. 
24. Id., with references. This is not to say that competition law authorities never compete in ways 
comparable to interjurisdictional competition between legislators (e.g., to attract scarce capital). For example, as 
suggested supra note 20, it may be that competitive pressures on legislators sometimes create derivative 
pressures on competition authorities; where this is so, a risk of regulatory degradation may arise. However, in 
general, the assumptions that must hold in order to draw a direct analogy with regulatory competition may be 
either unrealistic or too uncertain, or both. Cf. Eleanor Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, 
Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781-1807, 1789 (2000) (“[U]nlike the phenomenon of corporate 
charters, states or nations are not in direct competition with one another to have the most desirable competition 
law from the viewpoint of a firm that is a target of opportunity of that nation or state.”). 
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B. Structure of this Article 
The remaining text proceeds first by setting out how the structure of the 
“market” is evolving and who the main players are (part II). Then, more 
expansively it considers the processes by which competition in this sense 
manifest themselves (part III). In this context, reference is made first of all to the 
contrasting grand visions (hard law versus soft law, supranational versus 
souverainiste, etc.) that have been embraced and pushed by the most prominent 
rival jurisdictions as to how antitrust should be governed at the global level 
(section III.A). The analysis then turns to international antitrust cooperation, 
another competitive field where different strategic formats are employed and 
where interest has intensified in the absence of formal multilateral antitrust 
governance (sections III.B and III.C). A final focal point concerns “competition 
in competition ideas” (section III.D). This form of competition concerns 
alternative models with regard to what antitrust law should seek to achieve, and 
consequently how it should be shaped. A summary of the main points concludes 
the article (part IV). 
II. WHICH MARKET PLAYERS? 
Inevitable reference is made above and below to the United States and the 
European Union. Historically, since most of the few then-existing competition 
law regimes worldwide tended to be weak in terms of political power and/or 
legal powers, and since they amounted in some cases to extensions of the 
economic policies of the dominant political party (which in turn was beholden to 
industry), the number of (generally) functional and influential regimes was 
arguably three: those in the US, the EEC, and Germany. As Claus Ehlermann 
says in a recent book review,25 DG IV faced two competitors, the most prominent 
initially being the Bundeskartellamt (BKA), followed later by the federal 
American agencies (counting the DOJ and FTC, which certainly compete inter 
se, as a single rival26). Others have similarly referred (albeit without reference to 
 
25. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 326, 327 (2014) (reviewing THE HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW (Kiran Klaus Patel & Heike Schweitzer eds., 2013). 
26. With an already quite checkered history behind it, the influence and stature of the FTC from the 1960s 
to the 1980s was at another low ebb, meaning that during this period DG IV’s perceived rival would have been 
principally the DOJ. It may be added that U.S. federal antitrust enforcement also competes to some extent with 
enforcement at the state level. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by 
State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8, 10, 11, 13 (2004). The unstructured federalist 
governance in the US is contrasted with the EU’s more juridified framework in Firat Cengiz, Management of 
Networks between the Competition Authorities in the EC and the US: Different Polities, Different Designs, 3 
EUR. COMPETITION J. 413 (2007). In further detail, see FIRAT CENGIZ, ANTITRUST FEDERALISM IN THE EU AND 
THE US ch. 4 (2012). 
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the BKA) to the “duopolistic” market on which the Community and the U.S. 
operated as competitors.27 
But today we live in a multipolar world, to use an already-stock phrase, and 
the transformation has occurred in a breathtakingly short time span. Against a 
background of (i) globalized markets, (ii) increased exposure to international 
trade including, occasionally, cartelized trade, (iii) sometimes, a perceived need 
to attract foreign investment to support local development (although FDI 
arguments are double-edged), and (iv) a process of reincarnation in Eastern 
Europe following the disintegration of the USSR, the antitrust idea has grown 
and reproduced,28 with the adoption of over 60 new competition laws in the 1990s 
alone.29 Today there are more than 120 jurisdictions outfitted with competition 
laws,30 even if it is important to recognize that the implementation and (funding 
of) enforcement of such laws remains in many cases inadequate.31 With this 
 
27. See William Kovacic, Dominance, duopoly and oligopoly: the United States and the development of 
global competition policy, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. 39 (December 2010). Only a dozen years ago, after the 
European Commission had attracted the notice of U.S. newspapers with its handling of the Boeing/McDonnell-
Douglas and GE/Honeywell merger cases, Fred McChesney made the rather anachronistic observation that the 
U.S. was “still the dominant antitrust enforcer” but that the European Community was “striving to create a 
niche for itself.” McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition For and in the Field of 
Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1436 (2003); McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation, 27 
REG. 48, 55 (2004) (same quoted language). 
28. The term “antitrust idea” is borrowed from Lawrence Sullivan and Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the 
Growth of the Antitrust Idea, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 197 (1998). 
29. See, e.g., Imelda Maher & Anestis Papadopoulos, Competition agency networks around the world, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 60, 87, 345 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012). David 
Lewis has observed that in many countries the adoption of a competition law came too late: “[W]hat is 
remarkable is how frequently liberal market policies were implemented without first introducing the 
competition rules necessary to underpin the effective functioning of the newly ‘liberalized’ markets. This latter 
omission has opened the door to monopolization and concomitant abuses, which have caused a great deal of the 
misery and inequality that often accompanied liberalization.” Lewis, Embedding a Competition Culture: Holy 
Grail or Attainable Objective?, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 228, 229 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas 
Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). Two additional points seem nearly self-evident: first, it is not just 
competition rules but a constellation of policies, which by purpose or effect become a country’s competition 
policy, that deserve attention; second, without a minimal development of functioning institutions, the simple 
adoption of competition rules will likely have only symbolic value, if any. See, e.g., William Kovacic, 
Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition 
Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (2001); Michal Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust: 
Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries, in UNCTAD, COMPETITION, 
COMPETITIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21 (2004). 
30. See Hugh Hollman, William Kovacic & Andrew Robertson, Building Global Antitrust Standards: The 
ICN’s Practicable Approach, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 89, 90 (Ariel 
Ezrachi ed., 2012). 
31. For a cross-country statistical and econometric analysis of around 100 countries, of whom 80 had 
competition laws and 21 did not, see Abel Mateus, Competition and Development: What Competition Law 
Regime?, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 115, 123-34 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng & Ioannis 
Lianos eds., 2013). Sixty-seven of the 80 countries with a competition law had established a competition 
authority, but in only 30 countries did the authority appear to have resources suitable for its tasks; indeed, by a 
stricter measure only 12 did. Mateus concludes at page 24 that “governments around the world have not placed 
competition law enforcement among their highest priorities and have generally not endowed their [competition 
authorities] with sufficient resources for effective enforcement.” (footnote omitted) Mateus, supra at 24. 
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dispersion and diffusion of laws, the supply side of the market has become, as 
Kovacic says, oligopolistic.32 China has risen—or pounced, and seems to have the 
better part of the antitrust world mesmerized.33 In Japan, the JFTC in the last 
decade has started to shake free of its dog-that-didn’t-bark past and to become a 
serious, though still idiosyncratic, institution.34 Competition authorities in, for 
example, Brazil and South Korea have become very active, and punch above 
their weight.35 Australia, another significant antitrust jurisdiction, has had 
remarkable regional and global influence, the pending “root and branch” review 
notwithstanding;36 and for the future, India could potentially become yet another 
important jurisdiction if the efforts of the Competition Commission can earn it 
credibility and provoke cultural change. (This will likely take years to 
accomplish; several factors will have to conspire if the necessary environment is 
to be created.) Meanwhile, among the EU Member States it is no longer only the 
Bundeskartellamt that commands attention; intra-regional competition occurs 
routinely in the sister jurisdictions of the EU, paradoxically in parallel with an 
intensification of interaction and cooperation, a sort of grand “concerted 
practice” established formally by, and informally in connection with, Regulation 
 
32. See Kovacic, supra note 27. 
33. Two recent edited volumes indicate the torrent of competition law activity in China during the first 
five years of its application. See CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 5 (Adrian Emch & 
David Stallibrass eds., 2013); THE CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE (Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang eds., 2013). 
34. For arguments as to why the enforcement of competition law in Japan has been experiencing a long-
awaited renaissance, see Mel Marquis & Tadashi Shiraishi, Japanese Cartel Control in Transition, CEU SAN 
PABLO MADRID WORKING PAPER NO. 47/2014, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2407825 (also discussing the December 2013 amendments to the Antimonopoly Act); Simon Vande Walle, 
Competition and competition law in Japan: between scepticism and embrace, in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE 
REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 123 
(Michael Dowdle, John Gillespie & Imelda Maher eds., 2013). 
35. On Brazil, see Marcelo Calliari & Denis Alves Guimar es, Brazil: Toward a Mature Cartel 
Enforcement Jurisdiction?, in COMPETITION LAW IN THE BRICS COUNTRIES 13, 13 (Adrian Emch, Jose 
Regazzini & Vassily Rudomino eds., 2012) (“Brazil has experienced a veritable revolution in antitrust 
enforcement in the last 10 years, particularly in relation to cartel enforcement”). On South Korea, see Jaemin 
Lee, Korea, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITION LAW IN ASIA 47, 47 (Mark Williams ed., 2013) (while 
the KFTC answers to the Korean Prime Minister, the enforcement of competition law based on a consumer 
welfare criterion but also encompassing fair trade rules “has become one of the major tasks of the Korean 
government and the KFTC has been the vehicle to implement this objective”—which it is doing with notable 
verve). 
36. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 4, at 262 (attributing Australia’s influence, like that of Canada, to the 
country’s neutrality, independence, eclecticism, and “lack of power”, i.e., the ability to relate to other countries 
without necessarily causing them to assume a defensive or suspicious posture, an advantage hegemons often do 
not have). For further discussion of Australia, see Deborah Healey, Australia, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
COMPETITION LAW IN ASIA 344, 344 (Mark Williams ed., 2013) (“Australia has a strong competition law, well-
developed competition policy and a significant ongoing commitment to markets and competition.”). In early 
2014 the Australian Government launched a far-reaching review of national competition laws and policy. See 
The Australian Government Competition Policy Review, Competition Policy Review Issues Paper 14 April 
2014, (2014), 
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2014/04/Competition_Policy_Review_Issues_Paper.pdf. A final 
report is expected in 2015. 
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1/2003.37 (Here again one could refer to “co-opetition” among European 
competition authorities—both horizontal and vertical, since the Commission is 
not free from co-opetitive pressures from “below” despite its central role and 
ultimately superior powers. 
It therefore seems that, more than ever before, except perhaps in 1962 when 
the European Commission was endowed with substantial enforcement powers,38 
competition is breaking out in the global antitrust “space”. The European 
Commission and the U.S. agencies remain the market leaders, certainly. As 
Sokol says they still “compete for dominance” in relation to “system design and 
analytical presumptions”,39 and inevitably they are used as the main examples in 
this paper. Nevertheless, there is a growing field of other significant players, and 
a general dynamism in the market for market governance. 
III. MODES OF COMPETITION 
If the global antitrust field is now characterized by oligopolistic competition 
with two market leaders, a key question to be explored is: in what arenas, or 
through which mechanisms, does global competition take place? In this third part 
of the article, we take a tour through these arenas and mechanisms, or to cut 
syllables, these “modes” of competition. The tour is not exhaustive, but a sense 
of the “multi-market” nature of competition among antitrust enforcers seems to 
emerge from a consideration of the modes discussed below. 
A. Competing Visions of a Global Framework for Antitrust Law 
By the 1990s, one of the big questions being debated was: which vector of 
governance ought to apply to the enforcement of antitrust?40 Considering, for 
example, that (i) effective policing of internationally active cartels and efficient 
merger control often require significant coordination among agencies from 
various jurisdictions (the number of which was growing fast, as noted above), or 
that (ii) divergence of rules across jurisdictions tends to create externalities, or 
that (iii), inconsistent application within one and the same jurisdiction can result 
 
37. For a thumbnail statistical ‘scoreboard’ of how various Member States have performed in the post-
2004 “modernization” era (taking numbers of envisaged final decisions notified to the Commission as an 
indicator), see Wouter Wils, Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003—A Retrospective, 4 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & 
PRAC. 293, 295-296 (2013) (with the “top ten” on this admittedly decontextualized index being France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Hungary; the UK was 12th; 
Poland was 15th). 
38. See Lorenzo Federico Pace & Katja Seidel, The Drafting and the Role of Regulation 17: A Hard-
Fought Compromise, in THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW 54 (Kiran Klaus Patel & 
Heike Schweitzer eds., 2013), for the story surrounding the adoption of Regulation 17/62. 
39. Sokol, supra note 16, at 211. 
40. See, e.g., LEON BRITTAN, EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY: KEEPING THE PLAYING-FIELD LEVEL 
(1992). 
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in discrimination and competitive distortions, was there a need for supranational 
institutions? Or was it better to preserve decentralized, sovereignty-based 
enforcement? Relatedly: was it desirable to have formal frameworks of 
cooperation, or was informal and spontaneous cooperation the better approach? 
Sensing a window of opportunity sliding open, then-Competition 
Commissioner Leon Brittan in 1992 began to advocate the envelopment of 
certain aspects of antitrust enforcement within the structures of what was to 
become the World Trade Organization,41 just months after twelve legal experts 
led by Wolfgang Fikentscher had begun to give the idea shape in a far-reaching 
Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC), eventually published in July 1993.42 
For a while, Commissioner Brittan’s initiative gained some momentum and was 
supported by the incoming Competition Commissioner in 1993, Karel van Miert 
(if not always by DG IV officials).43 In December 1996, competition law became 
a ‘Singapore issue’ (a dubious honor), and in submissions to the WTO’s Working 
Group on Trade and Competition Policy, the Commission took the (revised) 
position that multilateral WTO rules should be developed to ensure the 
prohibition of hard core cartels and to ensure that each WTO Member’s 
competition law met common standards of non-discrimination, transparency, and 
due process.44 
 
41. See id. at 53. Following a reallocation of portfolios within the Commission in 1993, Brittan assumed 
responsibility for trade matters and became the European Community’s lead negotiator in the Uruguay Round. 
42. See Wolfgang Fikentscher, Competition Rules for Private Agents in the GATT/WTO System, 49 
AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 281 (1994); Wolfgang Fikentscher, The Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) in the 
Context of International Technological Integration - The Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 533 (1996); Daniel Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good 
Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1997); Eleanor Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for 
the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 29-36 (1995); Eleanor Fox, 
Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 15-16 (1997). See also Eleanor Fox, A Liberal 
Competition Code for the World Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, remarks delivered at the Global Competition 
Law Conference, Chicago, 28 October 2011 and reported in CONCURRENCES no 1-2013, at point 1 where the 
members of the Munich Group understood that political constraints likely precluded the full realization of their 
proposals but proceeded deliberately on a normative (de lege ferenda) basis to establish “the best that world 
antitrust law and institutions could be.” Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan, also among the Munich Group 
participants, considered that the DIAC’s substantive rules were too specific and failed to leave room for 
national diversity; they prepared an ‘alternative DIAC’ with rules they thought to be less intrusive. See 
generally id. (with points 16-52 reproducing and commenting in hindsight on the alternative Code). 
43. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, supra note 42, at 9. 
44. The drivers behind the EU’s (or at that time the Community’s) attempt to introduce a competition law 
discipline within the framework of the WTO included the natural affinity of European officials for 
supranational structures with binding rules and legal consequences such as the WTO, particularly given the 
analogy between WTO trade liberalization and the Community/Union’s own internal fight against trade 
barriers. For the former point, see Matthew Baldwin, EU Trade Politics: Heaven or Hell?, 13 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y 926, 933 (2006); on the latter, see Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, supra note 42, at 4-
10; ANESTIS PAPADOPOULOS, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 215-16 
(2010). Papadopoulos adds other factors as well, such as the goal of promoting broad convergence through 
multilateralism, and that of gaining greater market access abroad for European firms; and, less publicly, a desire 
to obviate the extraterritorial application of antitrust law by the U.S. agencies against European companies, and 
the possibility of using the Singapore issues as bargaining chips to delay agricultural reform. Id. at 216-219. 
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But it was not to be. In speeches beginning in 1996 and becoming more 
trenchant through 1999,45 Joel Klein, the then-Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust (AAG), announced his skepticism at the proposal to extend the WTO’s 
competences to competition law (i.e., to extend them beyond their current 
oblique application to antitrust issues46), and this set the stage for a key counter-
move. In 1997, Klein enlisted an expert advisory committee—the International 
Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC)—to study and recommend to 
Klein and to the Attorney General ways of developing desirable forms of global 
antitrust governance. In a celebrated report of February 2000, ICPAC stated: 
“While recognizing that certain core WTO nondiscrimination principles of 
national treatment and transparency would also apply to the enforcement of 
domestic competition laws, the ICPAC Report specifically endorsed a more 
modest role for the WTO than the establishment of new competition rules subject 
to WTO dispute settlement.”47 At the same time, ICPAC unveiled its idea of, 
among other things, a new “Global Competition Initiative” consisting of a 
 
45. See Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., A Note of Caution with Respect to 
a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy, Address at The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Nov. 18, 1996) 
(transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0998.pdf); Joel I. Klein, A Reality Check on 
Antitrust Rules in the World Trade Organization, And a Practical Way Forward on International Antitrust, in 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES: EXPLORING THE WAYS 
FORWARD 37 (1999). 
46. A few scattershot rules in the WTO Agreements address certain matters that are also of concern to 
antitrust. For example, under Article VIII GATS, a WTO member is supposed to ensure that monopolies and 
exclusive service providers established in its jurisdiction operate consistently with the most favored nation 
(MFN) principle, and that they do not abuse their monopoly position in a way that jeopardizes the value of any 
specific commitments the member has made. Article IX GATS requires a WTO member to consult upon 
request (but the obligation goes no further than this) if another member complains about other anticompetitive 
business practices causing harm to it. See PETROS MAVROIDIS & MARK WU, THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (WTO): DOCUMENTS, CASES AND ANALYSIS, 764 (2nd ed. 2013). See also, e.g., Eleanor M. 
Fox & Amadeo Arena, The International Institutions of Competition Law: The Systems’ Norms, in THE DESIGN 
OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS 444, 452-460 (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013); 
BRENDAN J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COMPETITION RULES 330, 375-377 (2010); Mitsuo 
Matsushita, Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 363 (2004); Brendan Sweeney, Globalisation of Competition Law and Policy: Some Aspects of the 
Interface between Trade and Competition, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 375, 401-413 (2004); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & 
Lothar Ehring, WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the Perspective of the Appellate 
Body’s Experience, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1505 (2003); Daniel Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global 
Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 489-494 (2000); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy 
in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995). Few are under the delusion that the WTO 
agreements establish cohesive rules to ensure that WTO members punish, prevent or even discourage firms 
from engaging in most forms of anticompetitive behavior. Outside of the telecommunications sector, where 
WTO members can opt in to the terms of a “Reference Paper” and thereby undertake to police the conduct of 
major telecoms suppliers (see Eleanor M. Fox, WTO’s First Antitrust Case - Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping 
Victory for Trade and Competition, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 271 (2006)), the limited experiments of WTO panels in 
solving antitrust problems have generally ended in disappointment. It could hardly be otherwise, given that, 
regardless of provisions such as the above-described Article VIII GATS, the WTO has no competence 
whatsoever to impose sanctions directly on private actors. 
47. Merit E. Janow & James F. Rill, The Origins of the ICN, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
NETWORK AT TEN 21, 30 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011). 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
169 
voluntary network of competition enforcers (and non-governmental advisors but 
no trade officials) developing soft instruments and working toward cooperation, 
consultation and soft convergence on “process” issues (but not initially on 
substantive rules48). This was of course the genesis of the International 
Competition Network, which has been a powerful magnet, more so than many 
might have thought possible when it made its first imagined appearance in the 
ICPAC report.49 Meanwhile, the idea of bringing some aspects of competition 
 
48. See Int’l Competition Policy Advisory Committee Final Report, Op. Att’y Gen. 282-285 (2000), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/chapter6.htm [hereinafter ICPAC], where Merit Janow and Jim 
Rill, two of the ICPAC members, explain that they had several meetings with U.S. officials, including AAG 
Klein, reassuring them that “the objective of the GCI was to provide a consultative forum focusing initially on 
process and it was not designed to force substantive harmonization;” see also Janow & Rill, supra note 47, at 
37; cf. Monti, supra note 11, at 354, 360. On the other hand, the ICN’s later work has perhaps inevitably crept 
into substantive fields and has generated thinly veiled messages to the ICN membership about where their 
substantive rules and application thereof should be moving. 
49. Obviously, the success of the ICN does not mean it is free of deficiencies. For example, as several 
observers have pointed out, the competition authorities of small and developing countries have sometimes 
found themselves sidelined in the ICN’s activities and decision-making, while the bigger and more established 
players, quite plausibly acting on impulses emanating in part from global commercial interests, set the agenda 
or attempt to set it. See Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges 
Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1, 46-54 (2009); Fox & Arena, The 
International Institutions of Competition Law, supra note 46, at 483 (but also noting at 483 and 485 that the 
ICN is accountable to its members); Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 
43 INT’L LAW 151, 167-168, 171 (2009) [hereinafter Linked-in]; Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, 
Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 211, 235 (2007); Kathryn McMahon, 
Competition Law and Developing Economies: Between “Informed Divergence” and International 
Convergence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 209, 233-35 (Ariel Ezrachi 
ed., 2012). Asymmetric influence in international organizations—not only because Great Powers and medium 
powers can overwhelm and thus tend to inhibit any dissent but also simply because participation has high 
relative costs for small countries—is hardly a problem unique to the ICN or competition law. Furthermore, 
Sokol points out that some minimal threshold of asymmetric power may be a condition of the ICN’s success, as 
it ensures the necessary investment on the part of the U.S. and the EU. See D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists 
Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY 
BUS. L. J. 37, 107 (2007). In that sense, a symbiotic relationship, of sorts, may develop between the powerful 
and less powerful members. On the other hand, given the ICN’s voluntary nature, the possibility of a 
widespread feeling of lack of “ownership” among its members bears risks, as reflected in the discourse of the 
ICN’s leadership. See, e.g., Andreas Mundt, The ICN’s 12th Birthday—What’s New?, COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L (October 2013), at 3 (“focus and inclusiveness will remain indispensable elements of our path forward”) 
(emphasis added). For the likely reasons why the ICN has been rapidly accepted by the global community of 
antitrust enforcers (save the authorities established in China, which I surmise may be seeking (i) to consolidate 
their standing, while making the political point that China can resist international norms if it so wishes, leaving 
themselves the option (ii) to join the ICN later in a position of increased strength and prestige, and thus possibly 
greater “bargaining power”, even if entry is formally free with nothing to bargain about), see Sokol, supra at 
105, 116, 121-22; D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055 
(2010). For further reflections on the ICN, see, among others, Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The 
International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS 51 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011); Hollman et al., 
supra note 30, at 92; BUDZINSKI, supra note 10, at 142-47; Yane Svetiev, The Limits of Informal International 
Law: Enforcement, Norm-generation, and Learning in the ICN, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 
271 (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, eds., 2012); Marie-Laure Djelic, International 
Competition Network, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS 80 
(Thomas Hale & David Held eds., 2011); Marie-Laure Djelic & Thibaut Kleiner, The International Competition 
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law firmly under the wing of trade law was rejected in the fall of 2003 in Cancún 
amidst Doha Round talks.50 It has not been revived, and it is hard to imagine a 
change in the wind in the coming years. A multilateral trade deal agreed in Bali 
in December 2013 is of little moment. That agreement may come as a relief from 
a trade perspective, having spared multilateralism in trade from an ignominious 
demise; but on the whole it is unambitious and does not address cross-border 
competition law issues.51 There is simply no political momentum at present for 
the development of a WTO-level competition law initiative of a scope 
comparable to those contemplated in the discussions from 1996 to 2003.52 
With the WTO relegated to the background as far as competition issues are 
concerned, the ICN is riding a wave of popularity and good will. It has been 
described as not just successful but dramatically successful and it continues to 
perform important roles.53 Unavoidably, the organization puts further strain on 
 
Network: Moving Towards Transnational Governance, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL 
DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 287 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2008). See also Marie-
Laure Djelic & Sigrid Quack, Overcoming Path Dependency: Path Generation in Open Systems, 36 THEORY & 
SOC’Y 161, 177-79 (2007). 
50. Among many others, see Josef Drexl, International Competition Policy after Cancún: Placing a 
Singapore Issue on the WTO Development Agenda, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 419 (2004); Taimoon Stewart, 
The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: Politics or Substance?, 31 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 7 
(2004); Andrew Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004); Aditya 
Bhattacharjea, The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing Country 
Perspective, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 293 (2006); Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False 
Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 383 (2007); Fox, Linked-in, supra note 49, at 154-57; PAPADOPOULOS, 
supra note 44, at 225-42; Alberto Heimler, Competition Policy as a Tool of EU Foreign Policy: 
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Soft Convergence, in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
ASSESSING EUROPE’S ROLE IN THE WORLD 82 (Federiga Bindi ed., 2010); GERBER, supra note 4, at 101-07; 
EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 1246-47 (2011). 
51. See Bridges Daily Update # 5: Historic Bali Deal to Spring WTO, Global Economy Ahead, ICTSD 
(December 7, 2013), http://ictsd.org/i/wto/wto-mc9-bali-2013/bridges-daily-updates-bali-2013/180991/. 
52. The ultimate effects of future preferential trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership are difficult to predict; most likely, such PTAs bode ill for multilateralism in general 
(though it is not entirely inconceivable that they could prompt key developing countries to engage more 
seriously with multilateral initiatives). This is not to suggest that there is no pending discussion of a return to the 
WTO as a forum for developing some kind of system to deal with issues of international competition law. For 
example, it is argued that a functioning competitive order on a worldwide basis is a global public good and that, 
given the limits of other global solutions (soft law, soft convergence and extraterritorial application of domestic 
laws), the WTO seems to be a logical forum in which to hammer out such competition law disciplines. See 
Lúcio Tomé Féteira, Right to Development and International Transfer of Technology: a Competition Law 
Perspective, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGES TO REGULATION 91 (Mario Viola de 
Azevedo Cunha, Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Lucas Lixinski & Lúcio Tomé Féteira eds., 2013). In the 
latter essay, Tomé Féteira carries forward Josef Drexl’s proposal of a new perspective in which the protection of 
competition in its global dimension assumes a “quasi-constitutional character” in the WTO system. See Drexl, 
supra note 50, at 456. As discussed infra note 58, and in light of the political climate alluded to here in the main 
text, the WTO may conceivably prove relevant for initiatives drawn more narrowly than the proposals that were 
on the table in the run-up to Cancún. 
53. Fox, Linked-in, supra note 49, at 173; Fox describes the ICN as a success when judged by its own 
organizational mission and as a success relative to other international organizations. See id. at 165-66. In 
another essay she emphasizes the subsidiarity principle as a key factor behind this success. See Eleanor M. Fox, 
Antitrust without Borders: From Roots to Codes to Networks, in COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION 
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the resources of smaller authorities.54 But it has clearly not been made redundant 
by (nor has it made redundant) the host of crisscrossing policy networks engaged 
in some of the same activities, like those organized under the aegis of the OECD 
or UNCTAD,55 or those meeting in newer fora such as, e.g., the African 
Competition Forum.56 As time goes on, however, the limitations and latent 
tensions of the ICN57 may lead to a collective and parallel search for solutions to 
 
POLICY 265 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Antitrust without Borders]. Her references to 
subsidiarity are not accidental, as subsidiarity can operate not only as a decentralizing force but as a justification 
for centralized solutions, depending on the particular problems requiring a response and the distribution of 
capacities within a given system (in this case the international system of competition law jurisdiction). 
54. Agencies that belong to both the ICN and other competition policy networks participate to varying 
degrees in these organizations if they have, despite tight budgets, the money and personnel to do so. Although 
financial aid is sometimes generated by ICN fundraising activities, smaller agencies are nonetheless typically 
faced with resource dilemmas and must sometimes choose between investing in one forum or another. On the 
phenomenon of ‘overlapping networks’, see Maher & Papadopoulos, supra note 29, at 84-6. See also Dan 
Sjöblom & Monica Widegren, ICN Membership—Opportunities and Challenges for a Competition Authority, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN 21 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011) (discussing the resource 
dilemmas of the Swedish authority, as it is granted no additional funds or personnel by the government for its 
ICN work; and as the attention the authority gives to the ICN must compete with its other activities). 
55. As the theme of this essay is competition, one might note that in some senses the ICN, as a new 
entrant (or, with respect to some activities, as a potential entrant), has put a bit of pressure on the OECD and on 
UNCTAD to continue to innovate and supply high quality services. Cf. Fox, Antitrust without Borders, supra 
note 53, at 273; Fox, Linked-in, supra note 49, at 166 n.46. On the other hand, Jenny stresses the 
complementarities of the ICN and the OECD Competition Committee, and explains that: “The overlap between 
the two institutions is minimal (some may be found in the area of technical assistance) even when the two 
organizations take up issues that seem similar.” Frederic Jenny, The International Competition Network and the 
OECD Competition Committee: Differences, Similarities and Complementarities, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN 93, 104 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011). 
56. The inaugural meeting of the African Competition Forum convened in Nairobi on 3 March 2011. 
Delegates from 19 African countries participated, together with representatives of several international 
organizations and other guests. The introductory speech on that occasion by Uhuru Kenyatta, at that time 
Kenya’s Minister of Finance (and today a highly controversial figure), is posted on YouTube. Uhuru Kenyatta 
launching The African Competition Forum, YouTube (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=UX7LtqGA__w (linking competition policy in Africa to allocative efficiency, consumer welfare and 
the de-concentration of economic power to promote an economic equivalent of political democracy). As Maher 
and Papadopoulos explain, the African Competition Forum is “expected to be the basis for the development of 
agency capacity in the region and to promote awareness and appreciation of competition principles among 
government officials and other market participants. It will facilitate interactions between African competition 
agencies, enabling them to share experiences, expertise and knowledge. The scheme may, in the long term, lead 
to the harmonization of competition laws of the participating countries.” Maher & Papadopoulos, supra note 29, 
at 83-4. The activities of the Forum are described, and informative newsletters are available, on a dedicated 
website: see African Competition Forum, http://www.africancompetitionforum.org/ (last accessed February 7, 
2015). 
57. Given the inescapable heterogeneity among the ICN’s members, it has been suggested at least with 
regard to some areas of the law that working toward “superior practices,” and the implicit expectation that ICN 
members can and will conform as far as possible to them, is an inappropriate basis for the ICN system. On this 
view, it would be better if the goal pursued in the ICN were simply for its members to (better) understand each 
other’s laws. See Monti, supra note 11, at 345. If this more modest aim were adopted, the term “informed 
divergence” would acquire its more natural meaning, as opposed to its current significance (see supra notes 15-
16 and accompanying text) as a kind of pressure valve that moderates the pace of and to some extent 
“legitimates” a broader convergence process. On overcoming obstacles of selectivity and bias in communication 
between different social groups, such as lawyers and economists but more generally between actors who 
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problems that cannot be addressed in an ICN context, in particular due to some of 
its defining features – no de jure power whatsoever, and a fundamentally modest 
albeit elastic mandate. It should not be ruled out that, despite the retreat from the 
WTO at Cancún and the prevailing wisdom that competition is to be kept out of 
that more formal environment, a cautious new impetus might arise in the coming 
years, leading to the launch of certain issue-specific initiatives that could 
generate (possibly plurilateral) WTO rules in a circumscribed field.58 In such a 
 
disagree, see Akihiko Nakagawa, Toward a Dialogistic Competition Policy, 20 HOKKAIDO J. NEW GLOBAL L. 
& POL’Y 171 (2013). 
58. To cite just one example, there are the bitter experiences developing countries have had being 
exploited by export cartels. The term “export cartels” in this context excludes exporters colluding on the direct 
or delegated instructions of a government, since the latter may constitute a measure subject to challenge under 
Article XI:1 GATT, as experience in the raw materials sector shows; the reference is thus limited to export 
cartels falling outside of that provision. Many scholars have written about the virtues and vices of export cartels, 
including recently Ariel Ezrachi, Domestic and Cross-Border Transfer of Wealth, in COMPETITION LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT 199 (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013). Not all export cartels are pernicious; but some have been 
compared to hazardous waste, and here there is a troubling international regulatory gap. Externalities imposed 
on developing countries – in particular, those lacking the capacity for credible extraterritorial law enforcement – 
can result in exorbitant wealth transfers in favor of foreign price-fixers, transfers likely exacerbated in the age of 
severe penalties for cartelists that get caught in developed jurisdictions (since credible sanctions tend to 
encourage “trade diversion” in illegal conduct where there is sufficient capital mobility). Certain WTO 
provisions, including for example Article 11.1(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
could conceivably be interpreted in a manner that disciplines export cartels in a few countries, including large 
ones. See D. Daniel Sokol, What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate 
Solution?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 967, 977-78 (2008). Article 11:3 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
could potentially be invoked to challenge explicit exemptions for export cartels, such as those provided for in 
U.S. law. But it is almost inconceivable that Article 11:3 could be applied against the more common forms of 
implicit exemption, such as one finds under EU law – which arise de facto from the Westphalian tradition that 
states do not normally regulate (mis)conduct with purely foreign consequences (i.e., where the “effects test” 
fails). Cf. ROLAND WEINRAUCH, COMPETITION LAW IN THE WTO: THE RATIONALE FOR A FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT 147 (2004) (“For example, [the question of] whether the mere non-enforcement of competition 
law against import cartels falls within the scope of [Article 11:3] is highly doubtful.”). And if implicit 
exemptions or non-enforcement cannot be challenged under Article 11:3, then even a successful challenge of an 
explicit exemption does not really remove the possibility for the defendant WTO member to maintain an 
exemption. Furthermore, since non-violation complaints at the WTO constitute a notoriously weak discipline, it 
must be concluded that the current ensemble of WTO provisions is inadequate to address the export cartel 
problem. Particularly in the developing world – i.e., where many countries opposed and derailed a WTO-level 
competition law regime – there have been calls for an issue-specific WTO-level solution involving new 
provisions, or for the development of a joint solution by the WTO and UNCTAD. According to one approach, a 
high-level commission could be appointed to study and define the problem and focus objectives, following 
which it would prepare an initial draft of a multilateral agreement for further consideration. (See CUTS, 
Contribution to the UNCTAD Roundtable on Cross-border anticompetitive practices: The challenges for 
developing countries and economies in transition (2012), available at http://www.cuts-international. 
org/pdf/CUTS_contribution_at_UNCTAD-IGE_2012.pdf, at 6.) Sokol has advanced a more defined approach, 
suggesting an enforceable WTO obligation of notification and transparency, with clearance procedures for 
“legitimate export joint ventures” in home jurisdictions that would beneficially raise the cost of cross-border 
predatory collusion. It appears that other pure export cartels (it is not entirely clear which ones) would be bereft 
of any antitrust immunity. See Sokol, supra at 980-982. Solutions such as this seem fit for further consideration. 
However, not everyone accepts that a global solution is necessary to combat export cartels. See CRANE, supra 
note 17, at 231 (taking the view – questionable, to my mind – that extraterritoriality and bilateral trade 
agreements can adequately address the problem). For further examples of leftover issues from the years of 
trade-and-competition discussions that seem, in the main, insoluble in the framework of the ICN, see, e.g., Fox, 
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scenario, and depending on the enterprise taken up, it may be expected that 
certain industrial interests in the developed world would mobilize against and 
seek to sabotage, or seek at least to persuade governments to water down, any 
such rules.59 A strong effort should therefore be devoted to stimulating a cultural 
change, reinforced if necessary by quid pro quos to alter the incentives of 
developed countries.60 
Further digressions about the ICN’s nature, work and capabilities could be 
added. But to return to the central theme, one perceives – in the episode 
described above regarding the emergence of the ICN61 – a contest between two 
models, each championed by a different jurisdiction. They were not just two 
models that happened to “be there.” The search for and development of a new 
global initiative was really a search for an American global initiative, and a 
strategic response to Europe’s attempt to promote supranationalist governance in 
international antitrust.62 The choice of the ICN as the leading framework for 
global cooperation in this field has been quite a coup for the U.S. DOJ, even 
though DG Comp itself was ambivalent about DG Trade’s WTO gambit,63 and 
even though all the EU Competition Commissioners from Mario Monti and 
Neelie Kroes to Joaquín Almunia and now Margrethe Vestager have fully 
supported the ICN’s activities.64 At the same time, the ICN’s broad appeal has 
 
Linked-In, supra note 49, at 168 and 173. In addition to export cartels, Fox refers to the adverse effects of 
antidumping used as a trade remedy, market access impediments, the use of state authority to immunize private 
conduct from antitrust attack, and more generally, issues at the intersection between competition law and trade 
law (whereas the ICN is supposed to be all antitrust all the time, a formula meant to exclude trade matters). See 
also Fox, Antitrust without Borders, supra note 53; Fox, Fingleton and Mitchell, The past and future of 
international antitrust, supra note 15; Brendan Sweeney, Global Competition: Searching for a Rational Basis 
for Global Competition Rules, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 209, 219-226, 243-244 (2008), with references; Brendan 
Sweeney, International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 58, 61-
62, 69 (2009); SWEENEY, supra note 46, at 399-401 (and chapter 9 generally). 
59. Cf. Bradford, Preference for Nonbinding Regimes, supra note 18, at 327 (“The United States would 
also likely oppose rules banning export cartels [ . . . ]”). Sokol recalls the strident objections of the U.S 
Department of Commerce (reflecting those of certain private interests) to any attempt to curtail the Webb-
Pomerene Act during the Antitrust Modernization Commission hearings. See Sokol, supra note 58, at 975 n.42. 
60. See Sokol, supra note 58, at 981 (“To provide an incentive for [exporting countries] to agree to the 
WTO solution, developing world countries would need to provide increased market access in other areas.”); 
Bernard Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, Tariff Bindings and Bilateral Cooperation on Export Cartels, 83 J. 
DEVELOPMENT ECON. 141 (2007) (showing that ceteris paribus a developing country could offer greater market 
access through tariff reductions but recognizing that tariff bindings required by trade agreements already in 
force constrain this possibility, effectively raising the “price” of the pecuniary or non-pecuniary quid pro quo). 
61. The above version of events is quite abbreviated. For a fuller analytical discussion of the rise of the 
ICN, see generally THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN (Paul Lugard ed., 2011). 
62. See BUDZINSKI, supra note 10, at 7143. But Cf. GERBER, supra note 4, at 111 (explaining that the ICN 
launch “had the strategic effect of further undermining support for a multilateral competition law project”) and 
at 115 (explaining that some interpreted ICPAC’s hearings in Washington, D.C. “as a means of reasserting 
[U.S.] control of the agenda of transnational competition law development”). 
63. See PAPADOPOULOS supra note 44, at 243-45. Furthermore, DG Trade’s support for the WTO option 
sat awkwardly next to the opposition of significant business interests, as expressed by UNICE in position 
papers. See id. at 214-15. 
64. See id. at 243; Ehlermann, supra note 25, at 326. 
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furnished scholars focusing on Slaughter’s “new world order” and related ideas 
with a useful case study of transnational network governance and communities of 
interest.65 
The question of whose preferred model prevailed is however of little 
importance for our purposes. What seems significant is the emergence in the 
1990s of two competing and possibly incompatible visions of global 
governance,66 arguably reflecting the anxiety of a former hegemon about its 
influence and leadership role being diverted to its chief rival. One might perhaps 
say something similar about the Commission’s full self-immersion in the ICN: to 
ignore it would have assured American dominance in an emerging, high-stakes 
sector. 
B. Bilateral Relationships 
In the field of antitrust, and to oversimplify a bit,67 bilateral relationships are 
established in two main ways: (i) by concluding a bilateral cooperation 
agreement (“BCA”), nearly always with non-binding terms and no dispute 
resolution mechanism (amounting de facto to “soft” commitments from the 
perspective of international law68), or its cousin, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MOU”, signed at the agency level),69 or (ii) by concluding a 
 
65. See, e.g., Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 113, 114-20 (2009); Svetiev, supra note 49, at 271-75. For an early exposition of network governance 
as a response to the “globalization paradox”, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183 (Sept.-Oct. 1997). 
66. Informal networks can undoubtedly operate side by side with formal institutions and binding 
multilateral rules. When a WTO framework agreement on competition law issues was being discussed, the 
European Commission considered that the ICN could function as a complement to what would have been the 
relevant WTO disciplines. See FIONA MARSHALL, COMPETITION REGULATION AND POLICY AT THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANISATION 147 (2010). Nevertheless, one may argue that reliance on the ICN as a central 
competition agency network and reliance on the WTO as a dispute resolution forum spring from quite different 
philosophies about antitrust sovereignty, and it may be argued furthermore that the full expression of the ICN 
concept as we know it and the formal incursion of the WTO into the antitrust field would at the very least pose 
some mutual tension. Hypothetically speaking, if a broadly framed WTO agreement on competition law were 
adopted, the ICN’s role and functioning would likely have to be redefined to some extent. 
67. For a more taxonomical discussion, see Valerie Desmedts, International Competition Law 
Enforcement: Different Means, One Goal?, 8 COMPETITION L. REV. 223, 237-49 (2012). 
68. See Mitsuo Matsushita, International Cooperation in the Enforcement of Competition Policy, 1 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 463, 468-9 (2002). 
69. ”First generation” BCAs have been concluded on the basis of somewhat diverse legal authority 
depending on the jurisdiction concerned. For example, in the U.S., such agreements have taken the form of 
executive agreements; therefore, in the absence of ratification by the U.S. Senate they do not constitute 
international treaties. By contrast, so far as the European Commission is concerned and with respect to 
agreements reached with third countries (but not agreements of lesser stature, i.e., so-called “administrative 
arrangements”), jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice requires the intervention of the EU legislator, 
which first authorizes the Commission to negotiate the terms and later ‘concludes’ the agreement, thereby 
making it definitively valid under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The 1991 cooperation 
agreement with the United States thus had to be approved by a joint decision of the Council and the 
Commission in 1995. See Case C-327/91, France v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. I-3641, ¶ 43 (Commission 
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trade agreement with competition provisions (“TACP”), whose terms create 
international obligations but whose competition chapters may be either binding 
or, not uncommonly, merely discretionary.70 In addition, with or without such 
agreements in place, agencies frequently engage in regular or ad hoc informal 
cooperation within the bounds of their legal capacities.71 Informal cooperation of 
this kind may follow the general contours of more formal agreements while 
avoiding their less expedient provisions, and it is also often inspired by or based 
on the Recommendation of the OECD Council on international enforcement 
cooperation72 or based on other instruments such as Best Practices documents.73 
The observed popularity of “soft” commitments worldwide in the cooperative 
competition-related frameworks just described is the flipside of the story 
recounted above in relation to the failed WTO framework agreement, which 
would have entailed binding obligations and dispute settlement procedures. 
Particularly in an environment of uncertainty, the softer the obligation, the lower 
the risk of entering into a cooperative arrangement (and of unintended 
 
lacked competence to conclude agreements with third countries). That does not mean, of course, that the mutual 
promises in the U.S./EU agreement are binding; to the contrary, the provisions are designed deliberately to 
avoid non-discretionary obligations and any kind of binding dispute settlement. As for the enhanced 
commitments undertaken in “second generation” BCAs (see infra section B.1), such an agreement must be 
authorized ex ante by legislation or ex post by ratification, or both. 
70. For example, in the free trade agreements concluded by the U.S. with other countries (mostly on a 
bilateral basis with the exception of NAFTA and, looking ahead, the Trans-Pacific Partnership), there are 
generally enforcement cooperation provisions but these are “soft,” non-binding terms within a broader “hard 
law” instrument. By contrast, some competition-related terms—in particular, those relating to state-
owned/controlled enterprises or privileged monopolies—embody firmer commitments, and dispute settlement 
may be invoked by either contracting party. For more detail and nuance regarding forms of bilateral 
cooperation, see generally COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011); 
PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 52-92. For a detailed examination of the “soft” competition chapters in 
preferential trade agreements with a focus on Latin America, see D. Daniel Sokol, Order without (Enforceable) 
Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231 (2008) (underlining the contrast between the non-enforceable competition provisions 
and the harder commitments covering other areas pertaining to trade policy in the same agreements). 
71. The most important legal limitation concerns the exchange of confidential information, a delicate 
matter both legally and politically, not least because powerful business interests tend actively to oppose the 
development of lawful mechanisms by which such information may be shared. In the absence of authorized 
sharing, agencies can however exchange not just public information but also “agency confidential” information, 
i.e., information generated internally regarding issues such as market definition, theories of harm or corrective 
remedies, or information, prior to any public announcement, concerning the fact that an agency is investigating 
a particular firm or group of firms. On the exchange of agency confidential information, see, e.g., Thomas 
Deisenhofer, International Cooperation in Merger Cases—An EU Practitioner’s Perspective, in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2010: MERGER CONTROL IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 227 (Philip 
Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2013). 
72. Organization on Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of the OECD Council 
concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings (September 16, 2014), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2014-rec-internat-coop-competition.pdf. For background 
leading up to the influential 1995 version of the OECD Council’s Recommendation, see, e.g., BRUNO 
ZANETTIN, COOPERATION BETWEEN ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 56 (2002). 
73. See, e.g., Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, EUROPA.EU, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/mergers/legislation/best_practices_2011_en.pdf (Oct. 14, 2011). 
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consequences with costly exit, if any); and possibly the greater the capacity of the 
parties to bypass lawmaking formalities that might end in deadlock (which also 
implies a correspondingly weaker base of legitimacy for the softer solutions).74 
1. Bilateral Cooperation Agreements 
With regard to the first category, after the U.S. had already been party to 
BCAs with Canada, Germany, and Australia since 1959, 1976 and 1982 
respectively, the U.S. and the European Community in 1991 concluded a well-
known BCA which included inter alia positive comity provisions75 and which has 
served as a template for many of the BCAs that followed in the next two 
decades.76 The EU has subsequently concluded similar agreements with Canada 
in 1999, Japan in 2003, and South Korea in 2009.77 The U.S., which has a strong 
proclivity for bilateral agreements as a matter of foreign policy,78 struck 
agreements with Canada in 1995, then with Brazil, Israel and Japan in 199979 
(together with a second-generation BCA with Australia the same year—see 
below), Mexico in 2000,80 and with Chile’s competition authority in 2011.81 
 
74. Cf. W. Michael Reisman, Remarks (panel on “A Hard Look at Soft Law”), 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 373, 377 (1991). See also, among others, Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in 
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 423, 434-450 (2000) (discussing how soft law permits parties to 
calibrate lower levels of obligation, precision and/or delegation, and giving examples of different permutations); 
Sokol, supra note 16, at 196-7. 
75. The U.S. also entered into specific positive comity agreements with the EU in 1998 and with Canada 
in 2004. The provisions of these agreements have never been formally employed, although some informal 
positive comity requests have been made, to little effect. See, e.g., ICPAC, supra note 48, at iv, vii , 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/1c.pdf. 
76. In brief, the 1991 agreement provided for mutual notification of relevant cases; coordinated 
investigations (with the aid, in particular in cases involving merger control or in cartel cases where a leniency 
application has been made, of waivers of confidentiality by key parties to permit the sharing of sensitive 
information); continual dialogue on a wide range of matters; traditional comity (basically, abstention out of 
respect for the important interests of a foreign jurisdiction); and positive comity (i.e., the possibility to request a 
foreign jurisdiction to act against conduct harming the important interests of the requesting jurisdiction). Id. 
77. DG Competition also has MOUs with the competition authorities of Brazil (2009), Russia (2011), 
China (2012), and India (2013). An earlier MOU with South Korea (2004) foresaw and then ripened into a more 
formal BCA. A similar upgrade could conceivably take place with the Chinese authorities in 2015 when the 
MOU comes up for review. See European Commission signs Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Competition Commission of India, EU COMPETITION & REGULATORY (Slaughter and May, London, Eng.), Nov. 
22, 2013, available at http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2038182/eu-competition-and-regulatory-
newsletter-22-nov-28-nov-2013.pdf. 
78. See, e.g., Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Ann-Marie Slaughter & Duncan 
Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000). 
79. See, e.g., ICPAC, supra note 75 at vii. 
80. Agreement Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, U.S.-Mex., July 11, 2000, T.I.A.S., 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/policy/cooperation-agreements/us-mexico-agreement-regarding-application-
their-competition-laws. 
81. Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation Between the United States Department of Justice and the United 
States Federal Trade Commission, of the one part, and the Fiscalia Nacional Economica of Chile, on the other 
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These agreements apply in addition to those with Germany and Australia, which 
remain in place.82 
Several authorities have suggested that the various “first generation” BCAs 
have been of limited value, for example because they do not provide for the 
exchange of confidential information absent the consent of relevant parties, or 
because positive comity has never gained any traction in practice.83 Without 
denying the limitations of first generation agreements, one may also posit that the 
negotiation and use of such agreements has created real value for the jurisdictions 
concerned to the extent that it has enabled agencies to build a communicative 
infrastructure and to intensify personal contacts, develop trust, and exchange 
expertise.84 A related point is that an implicit and less visible benefit, which was 
also an important driver of the earliest agreements but which today appears to be 
taken for granted, may be the avoidance or management of tension due to the 
actual or potential extraterritorial enforcement of competition laws.85 
 
part, U.S.-Chile, Mar. 31, 2011, T.I.A.S. 11-331, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ 
international-antitrust-and-consumer-protection-cooperation-agreements/110331us-chile-agree.pdf. 
82. See, e.g., ICPAC, supra note 48, at iv. Like the EU, the U.S. agencies have also concluded a few 
MOUs with competition authorities of other countries, specifically those of Russia (1999), China (2011), and 
India (2012). International Competition and Consumer Protection Cooperation Agreements. F.T.C. (Sept. 19, 
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/policy/international/international-cooperation-agreements. 
83. See, e.g., ICPAC, supra note 48, at xiii-xiv (“[I]n many respects, at present the bilateral agreements 
still remain limited instruments. Because they do not alter existing law or otherwise expand the powers of 
antitrust authorities, they do not expand the possibilities for the sharing of confidential or privileged information 
without the provider’s consent [. . .]. They may not provide a mechanism for resolving disputes that continue 
after the end of consultations. Further, the agreements do not implicate substantive law nor seek to reach any 
formal procedural harmonization between the signatory jurisdictions.”). For discussion of the non-impact of 
positive comity, see, e.g., Philip Marsden, The Curious Incident of Positive Comity—The Dog that Didn’t Bark 
(And the Trade Dogs that Just Might Bite), in COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY 301 (Andrew 
Guzman ed., 2011). 
84. In the workshop on which this contribution is based, I suggested that some first-generation 
cooperation agreements (including MOUs) might in this sense be regarded as “seeding” agreements potentially 
preparing the ground for bolder steps. A similar perspective is put forward by Brendan Sweeney, who refers 
more specifically to positive comity: “Perhaps the greatest benefit of positive comity will be its intangible 
benefits, those that arise from the fact that states have agreed to communicate their competition concerns to one 
another. If this dialogue produces greater understanding, greater levels of trust and confidence and perhaps 
greater convergence, it will have served a useful purpose.” SWEENEY, supra note 46, at 297. See also Randolph 
Tritell & Elizabeth Krause, The Federal Trade Commission’s International Antitrust Program, Presentation at 
the ABA’s 61st Annual Antitrust Law Spring Meeting in Washington, April 11, 2013, at 4 (“In addition to 
providing a legal framework for cooperation, the agreements have been catalysts to facilitate closer working 
relationships.”). Of course, two agencies can also develop trust and coordinated communication or working 
methods in the absence of any agreement. From this point of view, a first-generation agreement might be 
regarded by the agencies concerned as being superfluous; the same consideration would not apply, however, 
with respect to second-generation agreements (see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text), for which even 
systematic informal cooperation cannot substitute. Cf. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 80-1. 
85. See Tritell & Krause, supra note 84, at 4 (“While the first agreements were motivated primarily by a 
desire to reduce and manage conflicts that arise from extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws, modern 
agreements seek mainly to enhance enforcement cooperation.”). Conflicts have of course arisen, and have fed 
media frenzies, but overall what seems more remarkable is the absence of conflicts that boil over. The potential 
for conflict may however depend on various factors including among others the substantive field of law, 
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While it remains to be seen whether positive comity will ever come of age 
(which may depend on the jurisdiction pairs concerned), the obstacles to 
cooperation resulting from the confidentiality obligations imposed on 
competition agencies are in some limited measure addressed by other 
instruments, at least as concerns certain jurisdictions. In the first place, a country 
that has criminalized cartel conduct, e.g., the U.S., can employ the procedures 
provided for in (non-antitrust-specific) mutual legal assistance treaties, or 
“MLATs,” to obtain confidential information (and to cooperate in other relevant 
ways, such as by collecting evidence) if it has concluded an MLAT with another 
country, e.g., Canada.86 However, a legal gap may remain in scenarios involving 
two countries X and Y where X seeks the transmission of confidential 
information by authorities in country Y but either Y has not criminalized cartels 
or it has done so but there is no MLAT or equivalent agreement between the two 
countries.87 The constraints that limit the exchange of confidential information in 
the absence of an MLAT—which describes the vast majority of country 
combinations X and Y—have become increasingly acute, as anticompetitive 
behavior with multi-jurisdictional effects are nowadays a pervasive characteristic 
of the globalized economy. 
The response of certain jurisdictions to confidentiality constraints and to the 
frequent need for access to evidence located abroad has been to turn to “second 
generation” agreements, which embody enhanced commitments in hard law 
instruments (i.e., treaties agreed on the basis of enabling acts) and which thus 
take the original BCAs a significant step further. These agreements are 
heterogeneous but among their key common elements are provisions authorizing 
the exchange of confidential information between competition authorities without 
need for any waiver from the party or parties concerned—generally subject to 
restrictions intended to preserve the rights of defense, to limit disclosure of 
business secrets, personal data and leniency materials, and to ensure that the use 
of evidence in the requesting jurisdiction does not exceed the powers of the 
transmitting agency. For example, in the second-generation BCA signed in May 
2013 between the EU and Switzerland, the requesting party (in particular, 
Switzerland) is barred from using information received from the EU via the 
 
geographic overlap, frequency of interaction and the magnitude of the commercial stakes, which may have 
political economy implications. 
86. Technically, the 1990 MLAT between the U.S. and Canada, which has been used several times (in 
addition to their 1995 and 2004 comity agreements), does not require that the underlying conduct be of a 
criminal nature in the country receiving the request (a feature which is not common to all the MLATS that the 
U.S. has concluded). However, requests between these countries are evaluated case-by-case and limitations are 
imposed on the use to which the transmitted information may be put. At least in the realm of antitrust, since 
requests between the U.S. and Canada are made essentially in relation to horizontal cartels, which are criminally 
illegal in both countries, the absence of a dual criminality requirement is academic. 
87. For further details on MLATs, see, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST COOPERATION GUIDE (2004). More recently, see SWEENEY, supra note 46, at 314-17; OECD, 
Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, OECD Document DAF/COMF/GF 29-30, 267-
71 (2012). 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
179 
treaty mechanism as evidence to put individuals in prison.88 Another second-
generation agreement has been negotiated between the EU and Canada.89 
Australia concluded a second-generation agreement already in 1999 with the 
U.S., and in 2007 concluded another one with New Zealand (with an additional 
Austalia-New Zealand inter-agency agreement concluded in 2013). In the case of 
the U.S., despite its agreement with Australia, the underlying enabling legislation 
is problematic in that it appears to require foreign treaty partners to allow the use 
of shared information for purposes beyond the competition matter animating the 
request of the U.S. enforcer, which would present a legal-political obstacle in 
many jurisdictions.90 No country but Australia, which has its own enabling 
legislation in place,91 has ventured to negotiate with the U.S. an agreement of the 
same intensity. Finally, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway in 2001 concluded a 
second-generation trilateral cooperation agreement, made quadrilateral when 
Sweden joined the group in 2003. 
2. Trade Agreements with Competition Provisions 
In addition to bilateral agreements that specifically concern cooperation in 
the enforcement of competition law, bilateral trade agreements with competition 
law provisions or chapters are another means of pursuing a range of related 
objectives.92 Trade agreements with competition provisions (TACPs) are 
noteworthy because, among other reasons, they constitute a significant 
 
88. Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation Concerning Cooperation on the 
Application of their Competition Laws, May 17, 2013. For the relevant and understandably elaborate provisions 
on the exchange of confidential information, see id. at art. 7(4) to art. 10. Further details are discussed in Patrik 
Ducrey, The Agreement between Switzerland and the EU Concerning Cooperation in the Application of their 
Competition Laws, 4 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 437 (2013); David Mamane & Samuel Jost, Let’s 
work together—An EU/Swiss co-operation agreement has far-reaching implications, COMPETITION LAW 
INSIGHT 8 (13 November 2012). 
89. See European Commission, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission Report on 
Competition Policy 2012 15 (SWD (2013) 159 final, 2013). 
90. The relevant legislation is the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (‘IAEAA’) 
15 U.S. §§ 6201-6212 (1994). See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 39-40 (April 2007) available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_ 
recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (calling on the U.S. Congress to clarify that the IAEAA does not in fact 
require that treaty provisions must permit the U.S. authorities to use transmitted information for non-
competition purposes), cited in Edward Swaine, Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy: United States, in 
COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY 3, 19 (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011). 
91. The relevant Australian laws are the Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act 1992 and the 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987. In addition, Section 15AAA of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 enables the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to share confidential 
information with foreign agencies even where no intergovernmental or inter-agency agreement has been 
concluded. For details regarding Australia’s relatively progressive regime, see Marek Martyniszyn, Inter-
Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement, 19 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 11 (2015). 
92. See PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 93-144. 
2015 / Idea Merchants and Paradigm Peddlers in Global Antitrust 
180 
instrument of the EU’s external relations policy.93 The number of such trade 
agreements has grown significantly in the last 20 years, and the EU has been one 
of their prominent promoters, originally in the wake of the Soviet Republic’s 
disintegration and then, in the last decade, as a hedge against the remote odds of 
WTO members reaching consensus in the Doha Development Round.94 
With the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2010), the trilateral EU-
Columbia-Peru Free Trade Agreement (2011), and the pending trade and 
investment agreement between the EU and Canada,95 the number of bilateral (or 
trilateral) TACPs to which the EU is a party is now around 30. In general, the 
U.S. seems to have been less concerned with concluding TACPs, although there 
are such agreements in force between the U.S. and Singapore (2004), Australia 
(2005), Peru (2006) and South Korea (2007).96 Furthermore, the form of the EU’s 
TACPs often goes beyond traditional free trade measures, and extends to a wide 
range of integration measures and other fields, particularly in the case of 
“association agreements” (AAs) and “stabilization and association agreements” 
(SAAs). In part this is explained by the fact that the agreements can serve as a 
pre-condition for joining the restricted club of EU Member States, but the EU 
also concludes broad agreements with countries that have little or no hope or 
desire to accede. Papadopoulos assigns the EU’s bilateral trade agreements to 
three categories: (i) those with candidate or potential candidate countries; (ii) 
those with countries participating in the European Neighborhood Policy (i.e., 
Euro-Med countries and countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia); and (iii) 
those with selected trade partners, in particular Mexico (1997), Chile (2002), 
 
93. See, e.g., Umut Aydin, Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order, 
34 J. EURO. INTEGRATION 663 (2012) (discussing the bureaucratic self-interest of DG Competition in seeking to 
extend – by way of trade agreements and other forms of agreements – the global reach of the EU competition 
law model). 
94. Cf. Blanca Rodriguez-Galindo, Head of International Relations Unit at the European Commission on 
Competition and Development, Presentation at ICN Conference, Moscow (May 29, 2007) (available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?page=37). (“Given that competition matters are 
off the agenda of the multilateral negotiations for now, we would try to move on competition issues bilaterally 
in the context of the new generation of market-access driven Free Trade Agreements . . . .”). 
95. The title of the EU-Canada agreement—the COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND TRADE AGREEMENT 
(CETA)—reflects the extent of its ambitions. Negotiations on the CETA were concluded on September 26, 
2014, and the Agreement is subject to formal approval procedures on both sides. Further details are available at 
the European Commission’s Trade website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ 
canada/ (last accessed February 7, 2015). 
96. If negotiations ultimately bear fruit, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement 
between the U.S. and the EU will contain competition provisions and their intensity remains to be seen. One 
may also mention the sector-specific Open Skies agreement between these jurisdictions, which in Annex 2 
contains specific cooperation provisions with regard to competition, administered by the Open Skies Joint 
Commission (with representatives of the European Commission and of the U.S. Department of Transportation). 
No provision is made for the exchange of confidential information. Joint work has been produced, however. See 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE 
ALLIANCES: COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND REGULATORY APPROACHES (November 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/transport/reports/joint_alliance_report.pdf. 
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South Africa (1999), now joined by the above-mentioned agreements with Korea, 
Columbia-Peru, and Canada (with still other agreements under negotiation). 
The various agreements are heterogeneous not just across those categories 
but within the categories as well. The taxonomy will not be pursued further here 
in any detail, but some general observations can be made. One is the simple point 
that competition law is never neglected when the EU concludes bilateral (or 
trilateral) trade agreements. Even where the EU already has a bilateral 
cooperation agreement with the trading partner, as in the case of South Korea, a 
part of the trade agreement will nevertheless be devoted to competition, though 
typically with fewer details insofar as bilateral cooperation is concerned.97 
Second, some of the agreements, specifically those concluded with actual or 
potential candidates for accession to the EU, tend toward “deep” integration, i.e., 
they focus on ‘behind the border’ issues. The EU enjoys sufficient political and 
economic leverage in these scenarios to make the trade agreements in some sense 
analogous to adhesion contracts, and the EU uses them to extend the reach of its 
internal market (although free movement, especially free movement of persons, 
may be subject to strict conditions and post-accession phase-ins). The EU thus 
tends to extract far-reaching obligations from such countries.98 In the case of 
agreements between the U.S. and its trading partners, there may well be 
asymmetric bargaining power but, unlike the EU, the U.S. may not hold a 
comparable trump card strong enough to insist on an isomorphic remodeling of 
its trade partner’s substantive arrangements in the field of competition law.99 A 
 
97. The inclusion of competition provisions in trade agreements gives DG Trade an opportunity to 
negotiate on matters which, in the context of bilateral cooperation agreements, would be negotiated by officials 
of DG Competition. It is not entirely clear how policy coherence is managed between the two Directorates. It 
has been intimated that the process may be relatively haphazard given the small number of individuals (i.e., ten) 
working in the International Affairs Unit of DG Competition, who have a host of other duties to discharge. See 
PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 106, n.44. 
98. The EU is undoubtedly alive to the risk that a potential candidate country will undertake to adopt or 
reform a competition law in such a way as to mimic EU rules but then fail to implement the reform in what the 
EU regards as an adequate manner. See generally K.J. Cseres, The Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the new 
Member States, 6(2) COMPETITION L. REV. 145, 166-78 (2010). This may have been perceived as a risk 
particularly in the case of countries with illiberal economic legacies. Cf. GERBER, supra note 4, at 197-8 (noting 
the interest of the EU, in light of that risk, in exporting eastward its “more economic approach”). Such 
implementation problems can rarely be solved by the content of international agreements alone; however, with 
regard to actual and potential candidate countries, the EU has the leverage of conditionality not just until the 
conclusion of an agreement but until the closing of accession negotiations and the subsequent ratification of the 
accession treaty on the EU side (i.e., by all the Member States and by the EU itself). See Cseres, supra at 162 
(citing Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 11 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 661 (2004)). 
Once a country has joined the EU conditionality no longer plays a role, but of course membership entails the 
normal obligations and enforcement mechanisms under the Treaties, including the possibility of direct 
infringement procedures and indirect challenges via preliminary rulings. For an illustrative case (involving one 
of the original Member States), see Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, 
Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) VZW, 2010 E.C.R. I-12471. 
99. An interesting question is why the EU has in fact not gone further and experimented with institutional 
engineering in its agreements with suitor countries. For example, in the ‘Europe agreements’ that applied 
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third point is that while the EU may enjoy only limited direct leverage with other 
trade partners, i.e., those that have no realistic prospect of accession, this does not 
necessarily mean that the EU is unable to influence them meaningfully. The 
record is uneven but the EU—particularly where it is in a position to offer 
financial aid and/or technical assistance—has been able to steer national 
outcomes in the general direction of its preferences, as it has done for example in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even in relation to the third category enumerated 
above, i.e., countries that can negotiate with the EU on a more “equal” footing (in 
particular because EU exporters are keen to gain access to their relatively larger 
markets), the EU can at least potentially shape outcomes in the “socialization 
through cooperation” (repeated game) manner referred to in connection with 
first-generation bilateral cooperation agreements.100 
3. Conclusion on Bilateral Relationships 
The idea proposed here is that the negotiation of a BCA or a TACP, and the 
corresponding cooperation that ensues thereafter—which can be either formal, 
with the actual triggering of the agreement’s provisions, or informal and 
pragmatic in order to avoid the involvement of diplomatic channels or 
cumbersome procedures—provides a conduit through which influence is exerted. 
If the BCA or TACP is concluded between jurisdictions/authorities of 
asymmetric power (or even where relative symmetry prevails), it may well be 
motivated in part by the desire to maintain or spread influence. To a certain 
extent there seems to be an ongoing competitive game involving the U.S. and EU 
among others, in which “getting to” jurisdiction X before a rival does may yield 
dividends to the extent that ideas, beliefs and techniques can be shaped through 
those processes of negotiation and cooperation. The cultivation of bilateral 
relationships may thus be regarded as another mode of global competition. 
Within this mode of competition one may furthermore observe some degree of 
product differentiation, with the U.S. tending to favor bilateral cooperation 
agreements with ultimately discretionary commitments, and using MLATs where 
 
between the EU and the countries that acceded to the Union in 2004 and 2007, there was no attempt to require 
those countries to establish an “ideally” designed agency. Cf. Cseres, supra note 98, at 145. Two possible 
explanations suggest themselves. First, institutional reforms may imply many more direct and indirect costs 
than legislative reforms of a lesser order, and may thus appear to be more difficult to extract absent side 
payments. Second, the adoption by the EU of a standard institutional model for ‘export’ might be seen as 
inconsistent with the fact that the shape of competition enforcement institutions across the incumbent Member 
States themselves is marked by considerable diversity. Nevertheless, despite the lack of obligations to embark 
on institutional reforms, most of the “new” Member States (i.e., those acceding since 2004) have in fact 
responded to the system of networked governance in the field of EU competition policy by establishing 
institutional arrangements inspired by models typical of the older Member States (which are however in several 
cases currently experiencing significant or radical restructuring). See id. at 155. With regard to the restructuring 
of institutions, see generally EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2014: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES (Philip Lowe, Mel Marquis & Giorgio Monti eds., forthcoming). 
100. GERBER, supra note 4, at 199-200. 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
183 
they apply,101 whereas the EU has generally preferred to incorporate competition 
provisions (alongside political/democratic, social and cultural provisions) in 
more formal agreements with its commercial partners, its neighbors, and the 
countries that are or may one day be candidates applying for membership.102 That 
is not to say that commitments made between the EU and its trading partners 
need be formally obligatory; in general, the intensity of obligation depends on the 
relative bargaining power of the parties, which means that those countries 
seeking specific benefits from the EU will be subject to the greatest de facto 
pressure, and those seeking membership will accept de jure commitments.103 
In addition to the varying degrees of normativity just mentioned, another 
feature that distinguishes the competition chapters of EU trade agreements 
compared to the provisions in U.S. agreements is the character and intensity of 
the substance of the relevant provisions.104 The EU agreements go further 
inasmuch as they provide that, when the common trade between the EU and its 
partner is affected by a given business practice, EU-compatible competition rules 
are to be applied to that conduct.105 (Conversely, where the common trade is not 
affected, and where the trading partner is not an actual or candidate country 
harmonizing its internal regime with that of the EU, the foreign jurisdiction 
remains essentially free to maintain purely domestic rules that diverge entirely 
from the EU rules.106) Where the EU can bring significant pressure to bear, in the 
manner described above, it will go further still and oblige its partner to converge 
substantively on EU rules by reforming national competition laws or adopting 
new ones.
107
 This channel of “exportation” is not limited to rules on restrictive 
agreements and abuse of dominance. The strong tendency of the EU to insist on 
rules concerning state aid, public undertakings and undertakings with exclusive 
or special rights further illustrates how the EU seeks to use its trade agreements 
as vehicles of international (one-way) harmonization.108 
 
101. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 88. 
102. Id. at 92. 
103. Cf. id. at 138-141 (discussing the diverse methods of dispute settlement provided for in the EU’s 
trade agreements, their intensity and their implications for the delegation/precision/obligation formula 
mentioned supra note 74). 
104. Id. at 104 (citing EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: STRATEGY PAPER 
5 (2004)). 
105. See id. at 105. 
106. As a matter of EU law, even the Member States are permitted zones of substantive divergence when 
trade between them cannot be affected, and sometimes even when it can be. However, a comparison between 
third countries and EU Member States is doubtful since, in general, it seems more likely for any given 
anticompetitive transaction or practice in a Member State to be capable of affecting trade between Member 
States than it is for a given transaction or practice in a third country to affect trade with the EU. The direct 
impact of a convergence rule in a third country will thus depend to some degree on the volume of its trade with 
the EU as a proportion of its overall commerce. 
107. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 115. 
108. Id. at 116-17, Table 4.3 (2010). Of course, rules designed to minimize or eliminate unnecessary 
public obstacles to competition have been seen (somewhat akin to David Gerber’s point—see supra note 98) as 
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But there is another dimension of product differentiation that may be 
signaled here as well, which is again linked to the philosophy behind the external 
policies of the U.S. and the EU. This relates to the idea that promoting 
competition law and policy within the context of a regional grouping, i.e., in a 
manner modeled on the EU itself, is normatively desirable. For the countries 
engaged in such initiatives, EU-style regionalism, including in this case regional 
competition law, is often seen as a strategy that can at least potentially enable 
them to overcome a variety of difficulties. With the growth of regional models of 
competition law in their various forms, an implicit rivalry emerges between 
regionalism and the quite different model generally employed and espoused by 
the U.S. in its global relations. The next section briefly considers these 
alternative models. 
C. Regional Relationships 
On the one hand, the international community has been unwilling to move 
toward consensus on a formal multilateral framework for competition law (supra 
section III.A). On the other, the shortcomings of nationally bounded competition 
law in a commercially globalized environment persist. In addition to the bilateral 
cooperation and trade agreements discussed above (supra section III.B), a natural 
strategy for countries lacking the resources or experience necessary to maintain a 
credible enforcement system acting alone is to develop formal and/or informal 
cooperation mechanisms at a regional level. Lucian Cernat has observed that 
many developing and transition countries in Asia, Central and Latin America and 
above all Africa have in fact established such arrangements, some of which have 
significant and problematic overlapping membership;109 and Michal Gal has 
outlined the many reasons why in regional competition law solutions there is vast 
potential waiting to be let loose.110 The result is a feast for acronym enthusiasts: 
we may refer to, among others, ASEAN, CARICOM, OECS, CEMAC, SADC, 
SACU, WAEMU, EAC, ECOWAS and COMESA, and the possibilities multiply 
when other languages are used.111 
Apart from the sensible theoretical arguments in favor of regional initiatives, 
the countries that have experimented with regional approaches to competition 
 
essential inoculants for countries formerly under soviet control. See PAPADOPOULOS, supra at 115 (citing John 
Litwack, Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies, 5(4) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 77 (1991)). 
109. Lucian Cernat, Eager to ink, but ready to act? RTA proliferation and international co-operation on 
competition policy, in COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: HOW TO ASSURE 
DEVELOPMENT GAINS 1 (Philippe Brusick, Ana Maria Alvarez, & Lucian Cernat eds., 2005). 
110. Gal has written numerous thoughtful papers on the topic. See, e.g., Regional Competition Law 
Agreements: An Important Step for Antitrust Enforcement, 60 U. TORONTO L. J. 239 (2010); International 
antitrust solutions: Discrete steps or causally linked?, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION LAW? 239, 251-60 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011). 
111. See, e.g., Gal, Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step for Antitrust Enforcement, 
supra note 110, at 291. 
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law enforcement had a clear point of reference: the European Community or 
European Union.112 The EU plainly embodies a regional competition law regime 
par excellence. And the European experience suggests that an indirect, if long-
term benefit of a successful regional regime is the reinforcement of concurrent 
national regimes. For example, it can no longer be said that the Netherlands is a 
“cartel paradise.”113 Competition decisions in the UK are generally (i.e., putting 
aside extraordinary cases) no longer made according to public interest criteria.114 
And in France, invigorated public enforcement is matched by a ‘competition 
culture’ that has matured and is now almost taken for granted.115 For its part, and 
anthropomorphizing a bit, the EU may be intoxicated by its own success (the 
term “success” being necessarily relative given Europe’s penchant for existential 
and constitutional crisis), and may be innately keen to encourage international 
efforts to develop facsimiles or derivatives of EU solutions with varying degrees 
of supranational content. 
While the EU common market and competition model have influenced 
several groupings to some extent, most explicitly so in the case of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), a quite different model, that 
of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), has by comparison been 
neglected. The NAFTA Agreement provides for free trade among Canada, 
Mexico and the U.S., but with respect to competition its provisions are 
unambitious.116 Low-stakes cooperation in the NAFTA style also characterizes 
the South African Development Community (SADC) and the South African 
 
112. See, e.g., MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 412 (2010); 
GERBER, supra note 4, at 256-57. 
113. For the background to the Dutch story, see Bram Bouwens & Joost Dankers, The Invisible 
Handshake: Cartelisation in the Netherlands, 1930-1980 (2009), presented at the XVth World Economic 
History Conference, Utretcht, available at http://vkc.library.uu.nl/vkc/seh/research/Lists/Seminar%20Program/ 
Attachments/102/bouwens_invisible_2007.pdf. See also Wendy Asbeek Brusse & Richard Griffiths, Paradise 
Lost or Paradise Regained? Cartel Policy and Cartel Legislation in the Netherlands, in COMPETITION POLICIES 
IN EUROPE 15 (Stephen Martin ed., 1998). 
114. See STEPHEN WILKS, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION POLICY AND THE MONOPOLIES AND 
MERGERS COMMISSION (1999). 
115. See Laurence Idot, How Has Regulation N°1/2003 Affected the Role and Work of National 
Competition Authorities? The French Example, CONCURRENCES, June 2013, at 1, 8-9. 
116. Articles 1501(1) and 1501(2) NAFTA provide for mutual consultation from time to time regarding 
the effectiveness of competition law measures undertaken by each Party; and provides further that “[t]he Parties 
shall cooperate on issues of competition law enforcement policy, including mutual legal assistance, notification, 
consultation and exchange of information [. . .]”. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1501(1) & 
1501(2), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M (1993). However, Article 1501(1) specifically excludes recourse to dispute 
settlement under the Agreement in relation to all of the above principles of cooperation. For more on the 
competition provisions in the NAFTA agreement, see, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 356-60 (1997). While it is not yet known what specific form the 
competition provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (U.S. plus eleven others) will take, it seems 
unlikely that the agreement will go beyond mutual notification, the sharing of information (i.e., non-confidential 
information unless a waiver is obtained) and other general modalities of cooperation. Id. at 358. The chapter on 
regulatory coherence may have competition policy implications in a broader sense for some of the countries 
concerned. Id. at 358-59. 
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Customs Union (SACU); but nearly all other regional competition law 
frameworks have taken the EU approach as a source of inspiration (translating it, 
however, into highly diverse institutional structures and competences).117 The EU 
has not been a neutral observer of this tendency; to the contrary, the EU has 
financially underwritten some of the regional initiatives, including in particular 
the WAEMU, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
and the Andean Community.118 
Despite the hopes one may have for regional competition law around the 
world, it must be acknowledged that all of the initiatives, with the exception of 
the EU itself, have yielded disappointing results.119 This seems to be the clear 
thrust of recent evaluations.120 The situation is not hopeless. For example, the 
tensions over jurisdictional claims regarding the application of competition and 
merger control rules by COMESA may be overcome with time and iterative 
adjustments. And a series of lessons may be drawn from the initial regional 
integration efforts, which may guide reforms in the coming years.121 But a note of 
pessimism is yet in order. With exceptions, the failings of regional agreements 
thus far may be linked to problems that defy any remedy in the medium term.122 
One obvious cause of difficulty consists of the resource constraints afflicting the 
countries and institutions that participate in the regional groupings, and the finite 
well of international solidarity.123 Some of these countries also find themselves in 
groupings with other countries of radically different character and level of 
development. A still more brutal reality is that many of the latter countries bear 
the unflattering title of “basket case” economies and political regimes, or even 
borderline failed or failing states. Some are rife with corrupt institutions, some 
are embroiled in civil or international wars or conflicts. Many of these regional 
efforts thus face a grim horizon. Some may yet gain momentum and succeed: the 
current intensification of cooperation within ASEAN, for example, may fuel 
 
117. Alberto Heimler & Frederic Jenny, Regional Agreements, in BUILDING NEW COMPETITION LAW 
REGIMES: SELECTED ESSAYS 183, 183-201 (David Lewis ed., 2013). 
118. Id. at 186. 
119. Id. at 183, 186. 
120. See the contributions in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, supra note 12; Heimler & Jenny, supra note 117. See also Alberto Heimler, Effectiveness of 
Enforcement Cooperation in Developing Countries: What Role Can Existing Institutions Play?, Aug. 4, 2013, at 
6-13, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2335919 (skeptical about supranational 
solutions and their cost, and suggesting a focus on simpler forms of cooperation); DABBAH, supra note 112, at 
409-10, 412-17. 
121. Careful syntheses of lessons are provided by Josef Drexl, Economic Integration and Competition 
Law in Developing Countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 231 and by Michal S. Gal & Inbal Faibish Wassmer, Regional Agreements of 
Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the Potential, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 291. See also Fox and Gal, supra note 12, at 41-42. 
122. DABBAH, supra note 112, at 416. 
123. Id. at 414. 
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rising expectations, although that organization too faces formidable challenges.124 
Others will likely go nowhere. They may have to be reborn or renounced, or they 
may quietly wither. 
For present purposes, one may simply note that competing models for 
international cooperation were “on offer,” and the model promoted by the EU 
proved to be far more appealing for ‘consumers’ worldwide than the available 
alternative. The general failure of these consumers to use the EU prototype in a 
sufficiently imaginative way, or the failure to realize that local conditions in 
some areas likely required a new prototype or a sufficiently differentiated hybrid, 
is a separate discussion that is omitted here. 
D. Competition in Competition Ideas 
In section III.A above, it was suggested that the U.S. and the EU endorsed 
competing visions for a global governance architecture, to use a popular term, in 
the field of competition law. At a different, more traditional level one may 
observe a competitive struggle concerning the question of how antitrust problems 
should be approached analytically by policy-making and decision-making 
institutions. This friendly rivalry inevitably reflects something of a cleavage in 
values and prior beliefs, and on each side of this cleavage a complex of smaller 
but significant second-order fault lines may also be found. The terms of discourse 
that follows are limited to “approaches” and “models”. Such an analysis can only 
scratch the surface of the discussion surrounding values, beliefs and systems of 
belief.125 
 
124. Barring possible delays, the ASEAN Economic Community is due to be launched at the end of 2015. 
By that time each ASEAN member country is required to have promulgated a comprehensive competition law 
(some will fail to meet this deadline). One feature of the new initiative will be a coordination mechanism for 
competition law enforcement, the details of which remain to be worked out. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN 
Economic Community, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (2014), http://www.asean.org/ 
communities/asean-economic-community. 
125. For a recent elaborate study, see Ioannis Lianos, Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of 
EU Competition Law, in HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 1 (Damien 
Geradin & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). From a normative perspective, Lianos stresses that the interminable 
debates on the goals of competition law too often omit the fundamental question of which institutions (markets, 
judicial process, political process and so on), or rather which mix of institutions, should be assigned the task of 
pursuing and implementing those goals. Comparing and then choosing among imperfect alternatives, he says, 
should in fact precede debates over goals. In addition to this Komesarian (and, as applied to the competition law 
sphere, Sokolian) normative perspective, Lianos’ essay provides a helpful map of the “goal structures” found in 
both U.S. antitrust (a narrower structure, though not free of ambivalence) and EU competition law (broader, 
evolving, contested). The essay covers utilitarian and welfarist traditions as well as deontological and process-
based traditions, and casts doubt on some of the categories often taken for granted (raising, for example, the 
possibility that at least some strands of ordoliberalism are consequentialist and not deontological). Id. at 33. 
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1. The American Approach 
In the United States, the Supreme Court and the federal antitrust agencies 
(not to mention the heterogeneous state attorneys general) do not always see eye 
to eye. Occasionally, for example, a federal enforcer will express doubts or 
criticism regarding a Supreme Court judgment.126 Furthermore, while the 
Supreme Court has shown rather little interest in applying techniques of modern 
industrial economics (particularly where they seem to be merely speculative 
“possibility theorems,” as the standard epithet describes them), the high degree of 
expertise within the federal agencies enables them to engage in sophisticated 
policy prescriptions (as in, e.g., the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines) and 
sophisticated empirical work in connection with concrete cases (e.g., in 
challenging the Staples/Office Depot merger127). But although a majority of the 
Supreme Court may sometimes lean ‘to the right’ of the agencies, in particular 
when the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust has been appointed by a 
Democratic President and given the mandatory bipartisan composition of the 
Federal Trade Commission,128 the general paradigms and background 
assumptions embraced by each of these institutions are not very different. In-
house, the agencies may engage routinely in game-theoretic exercises and may 
explore dynamic competitive effects in great detail, but the point of departure 
when analyzing a competition problem is the same question that has been asked 
throughout the 1980s and the 1990s: when assessing competitive effects, what 
will be the net effect on output?129 Doubt is resolved in favor of non-intervention, 
which reflects a faith in the relative superiority of markets (vis-à-vis occasionally 
frail institutions) that remarkably persists even today, dissenters “on the left” 
notwithstanding, within the antitrust milieu.130 This faith is captured in formulas 
 
126. In several speeches, for instance, then-FTC Commissioner Tom Rosch questioned the wisdom of 
certain obiter dicta in the Supreme Court’s Trinko judgment (Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398 (2004)), which is notable for, among other things, its contention that rigorous 
antitrust constraints can dampen the incentive of companies to strive toward superior performance and enhanced 
innovation. 
127. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric 
Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 11 (1999). 
128. Bipartisan here means, as American readers are well aware, 3:2, or 2:2 if the 5th seat is temporarily 
vacant. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2014). 
129. It will be plain that no significant investigation of output effects is conducted in cases involving, in 
particular, naked anticompetitive conspiracies between competitors. 
130. It is said that one need not dig deep to find, underneath the economics-based claim that non-
intervention in the absence of demonstrable output effects guarantees efficient case outcomes, a distinct 
political ideology. This political ideology attaches great weight to the “autonomy of the dominant or leading 
firms”, and it produces a stylized concept of efficiency that systematically excludes the possibility that 
efficiency (in particular, dynamic efficiency) could best be served by protecting rivalry, mavericks and 
“upstarts”. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: 
THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77, 86 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
The paradox, then, is that, as it has come to be understood and applied, the efficiency orientation that dictates 
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that have been fondly recited on occasion by U.S. enforcers, such as “First, do no 
harm” or “Let the markets work”. 
The output model, framed by the idea that type I errors are more costly than 
type II errors,131 and that abstention is therefore the proper course when it is not 
clear—either on “per se” logic or following a (full or truncated) “rule of reason” 
inquiry—that a practice will lead to a net loss of output, may be encapsulated by 
the term “Chicago school antitrust” (even though Chicago is composed of 
different strands of thought not free of internal tensions). But the idea of a 
Chicago-based output model must be nuanced because an ulterior question can 
determine non-intervention even where it is found that net output would suffer as 
a result of a given practice. The ulterior question is: even if we can say abstractly 
that certain behavior can yield either greater or lesser output depending on a 
variety of factors that have to be examined case-by-case, is a typical judge (or a 
lay jury) capable of engaging in such inquiry, admittedly with the aid of an 
adversarial process, and reaching the right result within a tolerable margin of 
error? In the United States, the approach to the latter question is influenced by 
the consequences of erroneous judgments, as they can by statute lead to heavy 
civil liability (or to out-of-court settlements in the shadow of that liability risk). 
Although this concept of “administrability”—i.e., the question of whether tools 
 
antitrust law in the U.S. “protects monopoly and oligopoly, suppresses innovative challenges, and stifles 
efficiency,” id. at 77, and “thus protects inefficiency,” id. at 88. 
131. Error-cost reasoning is the influential legacy of work done especially in the 1980s by then-Professor 
Frank Easterbrook. While this reasoning seeks to minimize both type I and type II errors, there is also a 
common tenet, suggested by Easterbrook himself (inspired by Ronald Coase’s work) according to which a type 
I error (false conviction) is more costly than a type II error (false acquittal). The basic point rests on two 
assumptions: on the one hand, although a false acquittal will result in or prolong an anticompetitive practice 
(and its related rents), the marketplace will ultimately resolve the matter through self-healing (e.g., new entry, 
perhaps enabled by efficient access to capital); on the other hand, a false conviction will amount to a distorted 
market interference by government that cannot be corrected through the same self-healing properties of the 
market. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984). Courts and 
agencies might thus ironically become ‘anticompetitive’ instrumentalities of consumer harm. The idea that the 
risk of false positives should be accorded greater weight than the risk of false negatives is of course pointedly 
contested. See, e.g., John Fingleton & Ali Nikpay, Stimulating or Chilling Competition, in FORDHAM 
COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 385, 388-90 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 
2009); Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (2010). In the context of 
themes running through the present paper it is worth underlining that Easterbrook’s point of view is clearly 
based on what he perceived as robust markets, which may be true in the U.S. but is hardly a universally reliable 
assumption. See Philippe Brusick & Simon J. Evenett, Should Developing Countries Worry About Abuse of 
Dominant Power?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 269, 274-7 (2008). David Lewis, for example, describes a quite different 
balance between over-enforcement and under-enforcement in Chilling Competition, in FORDHAM COMPETITION 
LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY, supra, at 419, 420-5. Cf. Alberto Heimler & 
Kirtikumar Mehta, Monopolization in Developing Countries, Oct. 3, 2013, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2335653. In the latter paper, Heimler and Mehta make a 
similar observation about the distinctiveness of the U.S. and add, at the last page of the draft, that an empirical 
review reveals that young jurisdictions have “well understood” the risk of false positives in abuse of dominance 
cases. They point out that the focus of competition authorities in these jurisdictions has been actual foreclosure 
“rather than a preoccupation with restrictions of competition that may give grounds for assuming potential 
foreclosure.” Id. at 18. 
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and concepts (as applied to liability rules but also to remedies) can be applied 
workably in concrete settings—has driven first and foremost the Supreme Court, 
the federal agencies necessarily internalize the concept in their own decision-
making. It is remarkable that with regard to both values just described (output is 
to be maximized, and liability rules must be administrable), doubt is to be 
resolved in favor of abstention. Two different “schools” thus have common 
ground to stand on. Bill Kovacic has captured this confluence of ideas with the 
metaphor of a double helix.132 Beyond the pruning of liability rules and the 
strengthening of procedural filters to minimize the number of cases that survive, 
the double helix is also reflected in the Supreme Court’s philosophy of the scope 
of antitrust: in particular, in sectors governed substantially by regulation, such as 
network industries or markets subject to security laws, antitrust has in effect been 
relieved from its post.133 
To abbreviate, and though certain authors have sometimes used other labels, 
the U.S. model of antitrust can be summed up roughly as an “output” model or a 
“double helix” model, as nuanced above. What of the European Union? 
2. Europe’s Approach(es) 
Here too, distinctions should be drawn between the way EU competition law 
is understood by the EU Courts, and especially the ECJ, and the way it is 
understood by the “agency”, i.e., the European Commission.134 A further 
distinction may be made with respect to the authors of the competition rules 
contained in the Treaty of Rome, today known as the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. At least traditionally there has been a widespread belief 
in Europe that the competition rules were of ordoliberal content.135 There are 
 
132. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm 
Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2007); See also William H. Page, 
Areeda, Chicago, and Antitrust Injury: Economic Efficiency and Legal Process, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 909 
(1996); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917 (2003) (reviewing 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2001)); For recent discussion, see generally Nicola Giocoli, Old Lady 
Charm: Explaining the Persistent Appeal of Chicago Antitrust, May 30, 2012, available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2070666. 
133. See generally, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Daniel E. Haar, Resolving Conflicts between 
Competition and Other Values: The Roles of Courts and Other Institutions in the US and the EU, in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2012: COMPETITION, REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES 417 (Philip Lowe & Mel 
Marquis eds., 2014). 
134. The importance of considering differences between courts and agencies in any analysis of 
competition law where courts play a significant role is likewise highlighted in Eleanor Fox, Monopolization and 
Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe is Different, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 129 (2014) (discussing, inter alia, the 
divergent case law in the U.S. and the EU). 
135. It is always useful to recall that the ordoliberal tradition comprises diverse strands with occasionally 
quite distinct points of emphasis. Elaborate discussion is out of place here but it may be noted that the crucial 
“Hayekian turn” in ordoliberal studies occurred only after the composition of the competition rules of the 
Treaty. To the extent that those rules bear some ordoliberal paternity, therefore, the link would appear to be 
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good reasons to doubt that the shaping of the competition rules was driven solely 
by ordoliberal ideas. More accurately, their genesis reflected a compromise 
between very different competition-related values (e.g., on the one hand the 
desire to have an “economic constitution” protecting economic liberty against 
coercion from private and public sources of power, and on the other hand the 
desire to promote industrial upsizing, efficient production and global 
competitiveness).136 However, those who underline the ordoliberal character of 
European competition law are on firmer ground when referring to the policies 
and agency culture of DG IV within the European Commission, in particular 
during the period from the 1960s through the 1980s.137 
 
limited to the “formative” ordo era, which preceded the fusion of many of the original concepts with Austrian 
ideas about competition, liberty, the State and the social order. 
136. Researchers scrutinizing the archived preparatory documents have reached rather different 
conclusions, but one author has argued strenuously that there is little evidence of ordoliberal influence in the 
relevant documents. See Pinar Akman, Searching for the long-lost soul of Article 82 EC, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 267 (2009). While the latter paper is an illuminating and essential contribution, my own impression, due 
to the context of the negotiations as a whole (whose linkages included a significant agreement to postpone 
decisions on fundamental issues such as how the enforcement of the rules should be structured, who should 
enforce them and with what powers, etc.), is that smoking gun evidence of an ordoliberal program with regard 
to Articles 101 and 102 is indeed scarce (other than the final, “trump” condition contained in Article 101(3), 
whose activation however has normally been pre-empted by the way Article 101 and the other conditions of 
Article 101(3) have been applied) because the German negotiators who were ordoliberally inclined may not 
have been particularly doctrinaire to begin with (at least as regards Müller-Armack; as for von der Groeben, his 
views seem to have become more resolutely “ordo” at a later stage when he was made DG IV’s chieftain), and 
because the compromises made (which were conditioned in part by the long-running legislative debate in 
Germany) may have diluted what otherwise might have been rules of more distinct ordoliberal character 
(although, as regards Article 102, it has been noted that as of the late 1950s the ordoliberals had not fully 
worked out an approach to the treatment of dominant firms: see Heike Schweitzer, The History, Interpretation 
and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 119 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 
2008). That dilution does not mean that the ordoliberal influence was absent. Widening the lens beyond Article 
101 and 102, one could take the view that, apart from the Common Agricultural Policy, the Treaty as a 
comprehensive instrument, and especially its common market planks (including the free movement rules but 
also state aid and tax discrimination rules), coincided rather closely with ordoliberal views. The difficulty lies in 
separating out causal elements, since one could make a similar point about any orientation (in particular, 
Ricardian trade theory) that was based on the classical liberal tradition, to which the ordo scholars decidedly 
belonged. Even with respect to Article 106 (which provides that Member States must respect the rules of the 
Treaty including in particular its competition rules), although I have elsewhere followed J.O. Haley in 
recognizing its affinity with ordo values, that provision was originally proposed by the negotiators from the 
Benelux countries (as an antidote to France’s intimidating public sector); the German delegation merely 
endorsed the idea once it had been introduced. Having drifted too far already, the excursus may be cut short 
with two quick points. First, notwithstanding the above observations, Akman’s point that the ordoliberal genesis 
of Article 102 has been greatly exaggerated is easy to accept; it is now being incorporated into textbooks, for 
example. See RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW, 7TH EDITION 22, 196 (2012). Second, as 
EU lawyers know but as others may not, the “original intent” of the Treaty of Rome counts legally for nothing. 
(See, e.g., Schweitzer, History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles, cited above; Lianos, supra note 125, 
at 71-72, with references.) The canons of interpretation developed by the ECJ leave it free to follow a path 
completely contrary to any discernible original design if this contrary path were divined by the Court to be the 
Treaty’s true telos. 
137. Historians do not unanimously support this claim, however, since, for example, DG IV also had its 
share of social democrats, including those of a Dutch persuasion. For contrasting views, see the various 
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Since the 1990s, DG IV (now DG Competition) has absorbed many 
influences that have shaped its policies. It has drawn eclectically on “modern” 
approaches that it perceives to be consistent with its mission as a competition 
enforcer. Famously, it decided to break with old institutional habits and to turn 
toward a “more economic” approach,138 a vague expression that has at least two 
related dimensions. First, in (i) selecting and de-selecting cases, (ii) resolving or 
settling selected cases, and (iii) building policy approaches, DG Competition has 
embraced tenets and techniques associated with certain branches of economic 
theory and research. Since the late 1990s, for example, its policies on the control 
of vertical agreements have been palpably influenced by transaction cost 
economics. And DG Comp has been open to the theoretical advances of post-
Chicago industrial organization studies. Post-Chicago concerns regarding 
unilateral conduct, vertical foreclosure in general, and, in the field of horizontal 
merger control (and like the U.S. agencies), unilateral effects from concentrations 
in differentiated markets, have shaped both the policies and practice of the 
Commission. A second dimension of the “more economic” approach concerns 
the choice of policy objectives.139 In a move of both practical and symbolic 
significance, the Commission, particularly under the leadership of Mario Monti 
and Neelie Kroes, adopted “consumer welfare” as its magnetic North.140 
Consumer welfare, however, can be understood in different ways.141 In the U.S., 
consumer welfare is sometimes confusingly used as a synonym for the (generally 
short-run) welfare of society as a whole.142 As used in the EU, the standard view 
is that the term consumer welfare reflects a criterion of distributive justice143 and 
tends to denote a narrower concept in which producer welfare is important but 
 
contributions in THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW (Kiran Klaus Patel & Heike 
Schweitzer eds., 2013). 
138. DG Comp’s policy turn toward “more” economics has provoked a significant field of critical 
literature. See, e.g., Heike Schweitzer, The Role of Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law, in 
TECHNOLOGIE ET CONCURRENCE: MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE HANNS ULLRICH [TECHNOLOGY AND 
COMPETITION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANNS ULLICH] 511 (Josef Drexl, Reto Hilty, Laurence Boy, Christine 
Godt & Bernard Remiche eds., 2009). 
139. As noted earlier, the term “more economic approach” appears to leaves room for the Commission to 
factor in non-economic concerns, and the boundaries of the Commission’s discretion in this regard are not 
entirely clear. See supra note 21. 
140. See, e.g., Lianos, supra note 125, at 19-20. 
141. In further detail, see id. at 20-23. 
142. This very loose use of language is associated with the Chicago school and with Robert Bork in 
particular. See generally, e.g., RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, REVISED EDITION, 240-
245, 374 (1996); See also J. Thomas Rosch, [then-] Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, I say 
Monopoly, You say Dominance: The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, is it the 
Economics?, Address Before the Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 8, 2007), available at http://www. 
ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070908isaymonopolyiba.pdf, at 16; Charles Rule & David Meyer, An Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy to Maximize the Economic Wealth of All Consumers, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 677 (1988). 
143. See Lianos, supra note 125, at 26-29. However, as Lianos points out, lurking in even the most 
aseptic version of a maximum efficiency norm is a choice about distributive effects. See id. at 9, 57. 
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ultimately of a lower rank.144 Truer to its name, consumer welfare thus does not 
refer to an “output” model but to a long-run consumer welfare criterion more 
consistent with the idea of a dynamic “competitive process” in which potential 
threats to competition, such as where new entrants or “mavericks” might be 
suppressed or brought to heel, are treated seriously. The idea that defending the 
“competitive process” in the sense of maintaining ongoing rivalry and an 
“effective competition structure”145 (which today is often – though not 
uncontroversially – linked to competition from hypothetical equally-efficient 
rivals as opposed to competition from all comers irrespective of relative 
efficiency146) takes precedence over short-term efficiency gains is thought to be 
 
144. In the context of the exemption contained in Article 101(3) as understood by the Commission, 
Whish and Bailey explain that “[i]t is the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the relevant markets 
that must be taken into consideration [. . .] Negative effects on consumers in one geographic or product market 
cannot normally be balanced against and compensated by positive effects for consumers in unrelated markets 
[unless the markets are related and] the consumers affected by the restriction and benefiting from the efficiency 
gains are substantially the same.” WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 136, at 22, 163. In order for the exemption to 
apply, it is not necessary to show that a particular consumer who is harmed is then compensated for his 
particular injury. Giorgio Monti fleshes this out further in a hypothetical vertical restraint scenario where the 
restraint purports to expand the market: “[O]ne looks at the ‘overall impact’ on consumers affected by the 
agreement. So if before the vertical restraint 100 consumers bought the good, and after the restraint there are 
200 new customers, the overall effect is positive and the practice benefits from Article [101(3)]. Yet it may not 
be easy to do this kind of calculation at all (it will necessarily be an ex ante assessment in that one will want to 
enjoin the restraint before it has a significant market impact), and when comparing qualitative improvements 
and price increases the Commission acknowledges that this will be a matter of ‘value judgment’.” See Monti, 
supra note 21, at 9. 
145. The “competitive process” idea seems necessarily to require an approach to competition law that is 
sensitive to market structure, but any parallel to be drawn with the “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm 
(pioneered and pursued by economists such as Edward Mason, Joe Bain, Corwin Edwards, Carl Kaysen and 
economist/lawyer Don Turner among others) must be qualified because of the generally static conception of the 
latter, from which the former diverges entirely. See, e.g., (in English), Erich Hoppmann, The Development of an 
Idea on the Norm for a Policy of Competition, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 61 (1968); and for a concise account, 
Roger Van den Bergh & Peter Camesasca, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, 2ND EDITION 89-90 (2006) (also referring to post-Hoppmann approaches that differ on details). 
The idea of the competitive process is closely linked to that of the “freedom to compete”, or 
Wettbewerbsfreiheit. A recent description is provided in Roger Zäch & Adrian Künzler, Freedom to Compete or 
Consumer Welfare: The Goal of Competition Law according to Constitutional Law, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COMPETITION LAW 61 (Roger Zäch, Andreas Heinemann & Andreas Kellerhals eds., 2010). As the authors 
state, “[t]he goal of competition law [. . .] is to ensure the freedom to compete of individuals and thus to 
safeguard the competitive process”. Id. at 61. The freedom to compete then “generally leads to competition and 
competition leads to an efficient allocation of resources and thus to consumer welfare”. Id. Although it appears 
that protecting the freedom to compete is “thus to safeguard the competitive process,” this can be understood 
the other way around: if the competitive process is protected then individuals are guaranteed the possibility to 
exercise their economic liberty. But the central point for the European “efficiency versus freedom” debate is 
that consumer welfare is expected to be no more than, and no less than, an anticipated by-product of the 
freedom to compete paradigm. For a discussion of varying views within the economic freedom tradition, see 
Lianos supra note 125, at 30-36. 
146. Traces of the idea that foreclosure of equally efficient competitors may deserve closer scrutiny 
because their exclusion has more serious consequences for consumers may be seen in its earlier case law, but 
the ECJ now seems to be embracing the idea more firmly. See Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, 2010 
E.C.R. I-9555 (various paragraphs); Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-527 (various 
paragraphs); Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, judgment of the ECJ of 27 March 2012, 
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consistent with the Treaty; and at the same time it may preserve some (limited) 
degree of continuity with DG Comp’s “ordoliberal” past, in which the policy 
paradigm depended on the conception of competition as a dynamic process 
(which in turn is partly informed by the notion of competition as a discovery 
procedure). The Commission’s interest in post-Chicago approaches and its 
tendency to avoid overvaluing short-term efficiency gains results in a greater 
readiness to intervene in competition cases, and implicitly signals a greater faith 
in its own relative ability to secure desired outcomes compared to the ability of 
“the market” to do so. In this regard the Commission’s slogan, “making markets 
work better”147 (emphasis added), is quite telling. 
Finally, there are the EU Courts, and in particular the ECJ. Contrary to what 
is sometimes loosely asserted, the idea that the Court was in its heyday (or was 
then and still is) an ordoliberal institution has never been convincingly 
established.148 It is submitted, rather, that perhaps with some exceptions any 
ordoliberal-inflected judgments of the Court were produced not on any 
endogenous basis resting on the identity or predilections of the judges 
individually or collectively, but rather because a disposition of a given case that 
was consistent with ordoliberal views fit well under the circumstances with the 
Court’s vision of the Treaty, in particular its free movement and competition 
rules and associated doctrines such as the “effet utile” of those rules, and of 
European integration. Here one could cite judgments such as those in Continental 
Can, Dassonville and perhaps Säger and France v Commission.149 It must be 
added, though, that in recent years the ECJ has embraced a notion which, among 
 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, ¶¶ 21, 25 and 38). The ECJ may have different views with regard to the “equally 
efficient competitor” concept in the specific context of conditional rebates granted by a dominant firm, but 
pending cases will permit the ECJ to clarify its position and to resolve this tension if it so chooses. (For starkly 
contrasting views in this regard, compare Wouter Wils, The Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the 
So-Called More Economic Approach to Abuse of Dominance, 37 WORLD COMPETITION 405 (2014) with, 
among others, Luc Peeperkorn, Conditional pricing: Why the General Court is wrong in Intel and what the 
Court of Justice can do to rebalance the assessment of rebates, CONCURRENCES No. 1-2015, p. 43.) As a matter 
of policy, the Commission reserves for itself some room for maneuver in cases where dominant firm conduct 
threatens to expel from the market a less efficient rival whose presence is apt to lead to a more competitive 
outcome relative to the counterfactual. See GUIDANCE ON THE COMMISSION’S ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES IN 
APPLYING ARTICLE 82 OF THE EC TREATY TO ABUSIVE EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT BY DOMINANT 
UNDERTAKINGS, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, para. 24 (“The Commission will take a dynamic view of [the constraint 
imposed by the less efficient rival], given that in the absence of an abusive practice such a competitor may 
benefit from demand-related advantages, such as network and learning effects, which will tend to enhance its 
efficiency.”). 
147. This motto has appeared prominently on the Commission’s competition home page. See European 
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html (last visited October 24, 2014). 
148. A recent review of the ECJ’s antitrust jurisprudence rejects the notion that the Court has been 
concerned with the (German and Hayek-derived) concept of a “freedom to compete” (see supra note 145), 
which is an important but not the only version of an ordoliberal program. See Pinar Akman, The role of 
“freedom” in EU competition law, 34 LEGAL STUD. 183 (2014). 
149. Respectively: Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215; Procureur du 
Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837; Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co Ltd, 1991 E.C.R. I-4221; France v. 
Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-1223. 
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other interpretations, may appear to be compatible with ordoliberal thought. It is 
the idea that the EU legal order must protect competition “as such (as an 
institution).”150 When taken literally, this idea seems to transform competition 
from a medium through which ulterior values such as social welfare or consumer 
welfare are pursued into a self-justifying end goal. The adoption of the “as such” 
formula by the Court in its T-Mobile judgment151 may have seemed to vindicate, 
to some extent, the popular criticism that the ECJ was an “ordoliberal” Court and 
was therefore (i) biased against concepts such as anticompetitive foreclosure, 
whereby foreclosure would only be a concern if the excluded rival were efficient, 
since otherwise consumers would not in general be any worse off, and (ii) biased, 
more generally, against any tradeoffs between liberty and efficiency.152 It is not 
clear that ordoliberalism is really at play here,153 but it is clear that there is a 
concern for market structure and for the plight of at least some competitors and 
some consumers, all of which if interpreted in a certain way can be reconstructed, 
by those who wish to do so, as being part of an ordoliberal approach. In any 
event, the ECJ’s preoccupation with competition “as such” now seems to be a 
staple of Article 101 jurisprudence.154 In the context of Article 102 the Court has 
 
150. This formula originated in the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in British Airways plc., 2007 
E.C.R. I-2331. As the Advocate General states in para. 68: “Article [102 TFEU], like the other competition 
rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors 
or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as an institution), which 
has already been weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking on the market.” (Emphasis in original; 
citations to case law omitted.) The foregoing quote, which on the surface appears to reflect an ordoliberal 
commitment to competition’s “constitutional” nature, should be considered in light of the text that immediately 
follows in the same paragraph: “In this way [i.e., by protecting competition as such], consumers are also 
indirectly protected. Because where competition as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be 
feared.” The latter idea—that the structure of the market is protected in pursuit of an ulterior objective (i.e., the 
avoidance of consumer disadvantage)—appears to be at odds with the standard ordoliberal view that consumer 
benefits, while important, materialize as a subsidiary by-product of the competitive process (see supra note 
145). Similarly, the counterintuitive idea that the “competition as such” imperative in fact instrumentalizes 
competition in service of efficient resource allocation and the diverse aims of the EU has been noted as a 
plausible interpretation. See Lianos, supra note 125, at 53. 
151. T-Mobile Netherlands, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529, ¶ 38: “[A]s the Advocate General pointed out at point 58 
of her Opinion, [Article 101 TFEU], like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not 
only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of the 
market and thus competition as such.” For her part, Advocate General Kokott had directly transposed to the 
instant case the “as such (as an institution)” concept that she had announced in British Airways (quoted in the 
previous footnote). Paragraph 58 of her Opinion in T-Mobile Netherlands states: “[Article 101 TFEU], like the 
other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of 
individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as 
an institution). In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because where competition as such is 
damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared.” (Emphasis in original.) 
152. However, the Court in British Airways also confirmed that dominant firms could come forward in 
Article 102 cases with evidence of efficiencies counterbalancing the anticompetitive effects of their behavior. 
See British Airways plc., 2007 E.C.R. I-2331. 
153. There is a risk that the “as such (as an institution)” language will be decontextualized. See supra note 
150, particularly where Kokott’s coda to the quoted language appears. 
154. See GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited, 2009 E.C.R. I-9291, ¶ 63 (“like other competition rules 
laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of 
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not (yet) seized the opportunity to “reimport” the “competition as such” logic, 
even if it is where firms are dominant that the presumed “weakness” of the 
market structure is most likely to be a concern.155 
An opportunity for such a reimport presented itself in a 2012 case that 
attracted some attention, but the Court took a different tack and proceeded to 
clarify that Article 102 in no way precludes dominant companies from competing 
“on the merits.”156 This normally ambiguous phrase—on the merits—is now 
defined by the ECJ as competition on the basis of features appreciated by 
consumers: better offers in terms of price, quality, choice and innovation.157 The 
fate of the “competition as such” concept remains to be seen, and the Court might 
well decide to incorporate it within its Article 102 case law (rather than allowing 
the apparent asymmetry of the two fields to persist). But whether it is 
“competition as such” or “competition on the merits” as now defined (or an 
awkward admixture of the two) that guides the Court’s future jurisprudence, 
neither concept is likely to alter the Court’s trademark approach in cases where 
agreements or practices have the actual or potential impact of dividing the 
internal market along territorial lines coinciding with national borders.158 Here all 
bets are off, and the integrationist “genome” of the Treaty will in most cases pre-
 
consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such”); Protimonopolný úrad 
Slovenskej republiky, judgment of the ECJ of 7 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:71. Similarly, see Visa Europe 
and Visa Int’l Serv., 2011 E.C.R. II-1729 (interests of competitors and of consumers, the structure of the market 
and “competition as such”). 
155. The conventional judicial wisdom has been that, in Europe, dominant firms have a “special 
responsibility” not to distort competition any more than the very existence of the dominant position has already 
distorted it. This line of thinking is sometimes portrayed as quite innocuous but it seems to establish a kind of 
informal and unconscious suspicion of aggressive competitive behavior by dominant firms; it has occasionally 
led to dangerous conclusions. For example, in Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 664, the then-Court of First 
Instance stated that “Microsoft impaired the effective competitive structure on the work group server operating 
systems market by acquiring a significant market share on that market.” This improvident remark, when taken 
literally, evinces a gross misunderstanding of Article 102, under which a firm can by no means infringe the 
provision merely by gaining market share or even growing to become a monopoly in a given market. For further 
discussion of the “special responsibility” doctrine, see Kathryn McMahon, A Reformed Approach to Article 82 
and the Special Responsibility Not To Distort Competition, in ARTICLE 82 EC: REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT 
EVOLUTION 121 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009). 
156. Post Danmark A/S, 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, ¶¶ 22, 25. For discussion of Post Danmark, see 
Ekaterina Rousseva & Mel Marquis, Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for Assessing Exclusionary Conduct 
under Article 102 TFEU, 4 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 32 (2013). While the judgment is welcomed as 
a positive development, Rousseva and Marquis point out at pages 47-48 that the case law of the ECJ seems to 
be moving simultaneously in different directions, particularly when its jurisprudence on conditional rebates 
granted by dominant firms is taken into account. It appears likely that the Court will have the opportunity to 
rectify this, or to fail to do so, within a few years. 
157. See Post Danmark A/S, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, ¶ 22. 
158. As Barry Hawk once said, the aim to establish and maintain a single market was the “first principle” 
of European competition law. As Arved Deringer once said, impeding market integration was a “basic sin.” See 
Clifford Jones, The Second Devolution of European Competition Law: Empowering National Courts, National 
Authorities, and Private Litigants in the Expanding European Union, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH ARCHIVE OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Mar. 29, 2003), http://aei.pitt.edu/2882/. Many have written about the centrality of 
the market integration objective in the sphere of EEC/EC/EU competition law. For a recent summary, see 
Lianos supra note 125, at 17-19. 
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determine the outcome. In the absence of very exceptional circumstances, any 
practice that significantly hinders the free movement of goods or services will be 
held unlawful. This special and crucial zone of jurisprudence also aligns the 
Court, for “exogenous” rather than “endogenous” reasons, with the ordoliberal 
idea that public and private constraints on economic liberty must be prevented or 
dismantled. 
While the US model can be reduced either to the words “output model”, 
which is simplistic but on the whole reasonably accurate, or to the more nuanced 
“double helix” model, it is more difficult to capture the EU model in a short 
phrase, especially since it may be an amalgamation of several models. A point of 
departure is that EU competition law is not statutory law subject to lex posterior 
derogat, but “primary” law. It is elevated, in material though not formal terms to 
the rank of constitutional law (since by judicial interpretation the Treaty, 
materially but not formally, establishes a constitutional order).159 This implies, 
among other things, that from a legal point of view, and contrary to the U.S. 
position (see above), it would be entirely objectionable if the Court of Justice 
were to hold simply that the presence of sector-specific regulation renders 
application of the EU competition rules in the given sector redundant or wasteful. 
To the contrary, in the EU system, competition rules co-habit with regulation 
 
159. The premise here–i.e., that while the Sherman Act may be a potent social symbol it is not legally 
imbued with constitutional status–may be contrasted with the less orthodox view presented in Zäch & Künzler, 
supra note 145. According to these authors, antitrust legislation in the U.S. “came to be viewed as a charter of 
freedom on a par with the Bill of Rights. The constitutional status of American anti-trust legislation is 
emphasized in the paradigmatic arguments of the US Supreme Court ruling in the case of Topco Assocs. Inc., 
405 U.S. 596. ‘Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free 
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the 
Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and 
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete [. . .]’ The goal of [the Sherman Act, as 
amended by the Clayton Act] is to protect the individual’s freedom to compete. In contrast, consumer welfare as 
such is not mentioned. Thus the legislation correctly implemented the constitutional mandate.” Zäch & Künzler, 
supra note 145, at 65-66. From the standpoint of constitutional law, it cannot be concluded that the lush 
language used by the Supreme Court in Topco elevated the Sherman Act to the rank of constitutional law, or 
even to any intermediate super-statutory status. First, as a matter of context, and putting aside the obiter nature 
of the quote (and putting aside the fact that the Court’s later case law on horizontal restraints was seldom guided 
by Topco, a rare exception being Palmer, 498 U.S. 46, 49-50), Justice Marshall in Topco spoke for five justices; 
Chief Justice Burger dissented, Justice Blackmun concurred only in the result (not the reasoning), and neither 
Powell nor Rehnquist participated in the judgment. Against that background, consider a case decided shortly 
after Topco but before the Court’s volte face in the well-known case of GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36. Specifically, 
in Gordon, 422 U.S. 659, 685-86, the same Supreme Court justices that had decided Topco (but with Powell 
and Rehnquist this time) held unanimously that a law adopted by Congress after it adopted the Sherman Act—
in this case the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934—had repealed the Sherman Act insofar as SEC 
implementing regulations allowed a stock exchange to determine the commissions charged by member 
brokerage firms; in essence, the Congress was thereby able to carve out an exemption for such an agreement, 
which otherwise would have been per se illegal, from the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. There is 
a conspicuous absence of the Magna Carta language of Topco, or of any comparable language, and the Sherman 
Act was treated as an ordinary statute. Several other (and more recent) examples of both express and implied 
repeal of the Sherman Act by the Congress—including even the Clayton Act itself, which trimmed the scope of 
the Sherman Act in relation to labor unions and agriculture—could be mentioned. See also Ginsburg & Haar, 
supra note 133. 
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(whether of national or EU legislative origin), and will generally take precedence 
in case of conflict.160 The rules can be applied in particular where, for example for 
public choice reasons,161 such regulation is incompatible with the competition 
rules or where a regulatory system has failed, systematically or as applied in a 
given case.162 This system of hierarchy follows from basic principles of EU law.163 
Sometimes, in discussions of institutional design the crucial question of the rank 
that should be assigned to competition law is neglected,164 but this simple 
example of differences in the scope of U.S. law and that of EU law underlines the 
importance of that issue. Moving beyond the matters of scope and hierarchies of 
norms, Eleanor Fox emphasizes that EU competition law protects “rivalry” and 
 
160. There is a well-known derogation for services of general economic interest, but it does not apply 
automatically and it does not entail sector-wide exemptions. Indeed, the sectoral exemptions (or partial 
exemptions) that apply today under EU law are comparatively few. The Euratom Treaty creates a special 
regime in the field of non-military use of nuclear materials, but this does not establish a blanket exemption for 
the nuclear industry; in light of Article 106a(3) Euratom, and despite a textual deletion made by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Euratom precludes the application of the TFEU competition rules where supply or pricing activities are 
specifically regulated under the latter Treaty (agreements concerning the supply of nuclear equipment and 
agreements between producers of nuclear materials are not so regulated). The TFEU establishes partial 
derogations for agriculture and transport (where secondary law is relevant) and for military equipment. 
Secondary law establishes limited “block” exemptions in the insurance and motor vehicle sectors. To consult 
the relevant provisions, see Rules Applicable to Antitrust Enforcement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/ handbook_vol_3_en.pdf. 
161. See, e.g., HEIMLER, supra note 50 (highlighting the option of insulating competition law from the 
vagaries and distributional effects of special interest politics by way of constitutionalizing competition rules 
framed in general terms, as the Treaty of Rome does (and citing the “Hilmer Report”: FREDERICK HILMER ET 
AL., NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY (Australian Government, 1993), http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/National%20 
Competition%20Policy%20Review%20report,%20The%20Hilmer%20Report,%20August%201993.pdf). 
162. If the regulation (or the relevant public authority’s decision) has the effect of removing an 
undertaking’s autonomy so that the undertaking is essentially compelled to act contrary to the competition rules, 
the undertaking will legally be free of fault but the Treaty rules may nevertheless potentially apply as against 
the author of the regulation (or the against the authority, as the case may be). Further exposition of this subject 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
163. See Deutsche Telekom, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555; Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, 
IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1519, 1549 (2004); PIERRE LAROUCHE, Contrasting 
Legal Solutions and the Comparability of EU and US Experiences, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU 
AND US 76, 84-86 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds. 2009); Alexandre de Streel, Background Paper, 
in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE REGULATED CONDUCT DEFENCE 39-40 (BOX 3) (DAF/COMP 
2011); MONTI, supra note 11, at 355; GINSBURG AND HAAR, supra note 133 at fn 13 and accompanying text. 
For further discussion on the relationship between the EU competition rules and sectoral regulation, see, e.g., 
Alexandre de Streel, Interaction between the Competition Rules and Sector-Specific Regulation, in LAURENT 
GARZANITI & MATTHEW O’REGAN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, BROADCASTING, AND THE INTERNET - EU 
COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION 867 (3rd ed. 2010). 
164. One can appreciate the pragmatic reasons for this neglect. Constitutional reform tends to be a rare 
event, and building up the necessary momentum to reform a constitution merely to embed competition rules 
within it is not realistic. Any such reforms would normally have to accompany wider discussion of 
constitutional change. Furthermore, the conventional idea of constitutional law tends to pre-suppose that the 
rule of law is firmly in place, which is certainly not universally so. 
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“openness” of markets,165 and in doing so she describes the enforcement tendency 
without needing to identify the underlying philosophy. It is sometimes said that 
Europe embraces a “competitive process” model, but this immediately poses 
difficulties because in the US, the term “competitive process” has very different, 
often Darwinist connotations linked closely to short-term welfare and output.166 
For that matter, this problem of language is being compounded in the sense that 
the protection of an “effective competitive process” has become a popular 
formulation of competition law objectives for a variety of jurisdictions and is 
thus becoming increasingly entrenched, as seen in the work of the ICN.167 
Perhaps a way to avoid that confusion, which has already caused significant 
damage, is to say that EU competition law is driven by a “dynamic competitive 
process” model.168 But EU competition law is ultimately inseparable from the 
treaty in which it is embedded (whose character is revealed through the well-
known canons of interpretation of the ECJ, including selectively applied 
teleology169). From the point of view of the ECJ, the objectives of the competition 
rules must be situated coherently within the objectives pursued by the treaty as a 
whole.170 Therefore, even the designation “dynamic competitive process” is a 
 
165. Eleanor Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 149, 
section III (2003). This is a recurring theme in Fox’s work. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 130, at 86; Fox, Linked-in, 
supra note 49, at 153 (the European institutions protect “dynamic rivalry, market access, and the competitive 
structure of the market”). 
166. In my view, one way to underline the difference in usage is to note that in the EU, the term 
“competitive process” is used when an authority seeks to intervene, whereas in the US the term is more often 
used to caution against false convictions in cases of aggressive market conduct. By way of digression, 
protecting the competitive process in the EU context must be reconciled with the prohibition of excessive prices 
under the EU case law, whereas even the highest monopoly prices cannot be touched by Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act outside the realm of de facto essential facility cases. See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom, 2010 E.C.R. I-
9555. Although it may not be immediately obvious how the excessive pricing offense can fit with the 
competitive process paradigm, one could say that an appropriate remedy in such a case under Article 102 TFEU 
is the dismantling of (artificial) entry barriers that enable the dominant firm to charge exorbitant prices. Such a 
remedy would then permit the competitive process to reassert itself. 
167. See Monti, supra note 11, at 352-354 (discussing the ICN Report on the Objectives of Unilateral 
Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-created Monopolies of 2007, 
and noting the language difficulty). 
168. My tentative use of the term “dynamic competitive process” is not to be confused with the identical 
term used by Blair in a different context. See Douglas Blair, On Variable Majority Rule and Kramer’s Dynamic 
Competitive Process, 46 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 667 (1979). 
169. See, e.g., JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 233-270 (1993) (discussing the Court’s various interpretive 
techniques). The idea that the Court uses teleological reasoning selectively may arguably be supported by its 
recourse to literalism in some instances. See id. at 234-237. Many other studies are devoted to the styles of 
reasoning employed by the ECJ. See, e.g., ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 2ND EDITION, 
chapter 16 (2006). 
170. See, e.g., Lianos, supra note 125, at 2. For a recent statement of the systematic interpretation 
argument, particularly with reference to the post-Lisbon era, see Suzanne Kingston, Competition and 
Environmental Protection: A Case of Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet?, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 
2012: COMPETITION, REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES 113 (Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2014). The 
significance of new or altered provisions in the Lisbon Treaty has been observed by other scholars as well. See, 
e.g., Ioannis Lianos & Arianna Andreangeli, The European Union: The Competition Law System and the 
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simplification that should be used with caution. An alternative term that has been 
put forward aspirationally is “holistic” competition law.171 This too calls for 
caution, as holism might be over-inclusive and could be turned into an epithet by 
critics quick to equate a complex goal structure with rule by expansive discretion, 
unpredictability, and errors in both directions, resulting in over-deterrence as well 
as under-deterrence. 
3. Competition between the American and European Approaches to 
Competition Law 
The U.S. model (emphasizing outcomes first and last) and the more 
complicated EU model (treating outcomes as important but giving process the 
final word) are rivalrous and ultimately, it would seem, irreconcilable172—even if 
in general they may converge on case results.173 How have the two models fared? 
It may come as no surprise that the European Community/European Union model 
of competition law has enjoyed far more success on the “market” than has the 
U.S. model. Although further research should detail jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
why the “output” or “double helix” has not been more readily accepted in the 
majority of jurisdictions worldwide, the general reasons may be stated without 
difficulty. In the 1970s, when antitrust was transformed in the U.S., the few 
jurisdictions elsewhere with fully functional competition law systems 
 
Union’s Norms, in THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS 384, 406-407 (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael 
J. Trebilcock eds., 2013). For extensive critical discussion of the aims of competition law in the EU (using the 
U.S. as a comparative case), see BEN VAN ROMPUY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: THE SOLE CONCERN OF MODERN 
ANTITRUST POLICY? NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 101 TFEU (2012). 
171. See Lianos, supra note 125, at 47-62. 
172. Cf. Monti, supra note 11, at 353 (referring to a “fundamental schism” between “those who believe 
that one should merely protect the process and not consider the likely outcomes (on the basis that beneficial 
outcomes will result provided we ensure markets remain competitive) and those who think that absent proof of 
anticompetitive effects in terms of higher prices or reduced output, one is likely to over-enforce the law, 
reducing economic welfare” (footnote omitted)). 
173. Notwithstanding the relevant differences, Monti warns against assuming that a welfare-driven 
approach and a European “traditionalist” approach will diverge on outcomes; such will be the case only on the 
margins. See generally Monti, EU Competition Law from Rome to Lisbon—Social Market Economy, in AIMS 
AND VALUES IN COMPETITION LAW 27, 45 (Caroline Heide-Jorgensen, Christian Bergqvist, Ulla Neergard & 
Sune Troels Poulsen eds., 2013) (“Three beliefs underpin the traditionalist response: first, economic freedom is 
more important than efficiency; second, monopoly is less likely to yield economic benefit than competition; 
third, it is hard to predict all welfare effects. This is the essence of the difference, which will arise only rarely.” 
(footnote omitted) Monti’s example of where outcomes would diverge is a proposed “merger to monopoly” that 
would be efficient inasmuch as it would reduce the production costs of the merged entity, which then may or 
may not entail reduced prices for consumers. Clearly, “traditionalists” would decline to approve such a merger, 
whereas adherents of the efficiency paradigm would merely insist on rigorous evidence of the claimed 
efficiencies. This example highlights the fact that a pure efficiency approach, as opposed to a genuine consumer 
welfare approach, omits or at least yields to other policy domains the additional distributive question of whether 
consumers will truly benefit from the efficiencies gained as a result of the merger. The assumption, rather, is 
that society will be better off when such efficient elimination of rivalry is allowed. 
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(essentially, Germany and the European Economic Community174) already had 
intellectual foundations underpinning their competition law paradigm which 
precluded a reductionist output model. In the 1980s and especially the 1990s, 
when interest in competition law around the world began to surge, the countries 
adopting new competition laws—mostly developing countries—realized that 
their needs and background conditions were quite different from those of the 
U.S.175 As Dan Crane suggests, for example, “many developing countries weren’t 
ready to adopt an antitrust policy that seemed designed to do very little.”176 Crane 
adds that the EU “arguably filled the gap and became a much more important 
source of ideas for developing antitrust regimes like China, India, South Africa, 
and Brazil.”177 Eleanor Fox—who was herself instrumental in the early 
development of the competition laws of certain developing countries such as 
 
174. In Japan, the JFTC in the 1970s reasserted itself and began to make a rather dramatic impact (until 
competition policy faded again in the 1980s), but nevertheless it would be a stretch to characterize Japanese 
competition law even in the 1970s as fully functional. Marquis & Shiraishi, supra note 34. There were other 
competition law regimes in place in the 1970s, of course, but each was held back by a variety of factors such as 
faulty legislative drafting, institutional and political economy factors, overbroad exemptions and so on. For 
example, competition law enforcement in India under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 
was notoriously weak. Another example is Australia, where, despite competition rules going back to 1906, 
enforcement under the amended Trade Practices Act 1974 did not gain strong momentum until the 1990s 
(largely by virtue of the recommendations in the 1993 Hilmer Report, supra note 161). 
175. Sokol & Stephan, supra note 7, at 2. 
176. Crane, Interview with Eleanor Fox: Networking the world, CONCURRENCES no 4-2011, at 2. It is 
likely that Crane’s words, “designed to do very little,” are deliberately caricaturized in order to capture popular 
perceptions of the Chicago school that might color its image abroad. In the first place, it has been argued that 
Chicago’s normative edifice was not “designed” but was (re)constructed following successive analyses of 
antitrust-relevant business practices conducted by, above all, Aaron Director and his students and associates in 
the 1950s and 1960s. See Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 925, 
926 (1979); William Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust 
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (1989). (That seems to be a valid argument as 
far as the grand Chicago syntheses of Posner and Bork are concerned: these were achieved in 1976 and 1978.) 
Second, the question of whether Chicago antitrust essentially prescribes agency inaction (outside of cartel 
enforcement) and presumptive case dismissal of private claims depends on which of its adherents is taken to be 
its spokesman: Posner, whom Crane calls a Chicago School centrist, has by no means pleaded for a hands-off 
antitrust policy. See Daniel Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1917-18 
(2009) (enumerating fact patterns to which Posner has suggested antitrust liability rules are relevant). 
177. Crane, supra note 176, at 2. Michal Gal and Jorge Padilla provide evidence of this in The Follower 
Phenomenon: Implications for Design of Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 899, 
903, 920 (2010) (at least 43 jurisdictions have “copied” the EU’s prohibition on the abuse of dominance). Cf. 
Heimler & Mehta, Monopolization in developing countries, supra note 131 (noting the popularity among 
developing countries of an abuse of dominance provision that can be applied to excessive pricing scenarios, 
unlike Section 2 of the Sherman Act; but also highlighting that developing countries have followed the 
UNCTAD model law, which also covers compulsory contract terms that may directly or indirectly limit 
competitors). Of course, it is not taken for granted that the literal replication of a foreign provision of law such 
as Article 102 TFEU reliably indicates that its interpretation and enforcement will parallel or even compare with 
the emulated jurisdiction, not least because the institutions responsible for these tasks are different (i.e., 
legislators are not normally charged with interpreting or applying the law). Nevertheless, the notable frequency 
of the “grafting” of the EU rule seems significant. In some cases, Article 102 may have been perceived as 
attractive on the strength of its own apparent merits and accepted spontaneously. In other areas, its acceptance 
likely reflects active promotion by the EU, including by way of bargaining and/or conditionality. 
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South Africa—shares Crane’s assessment: “The EU has a more copious view 
than the U.S. of harm to competition. It seeks to preserve competitive rivalry in 
concentrated markets and to safeguard openness and access (albeit sometimes 
without a sufficient rudder). Openness of markets is in the DNA of Europe. EU 
law is more sympathetic to economies that have suffered severe blockage of 
markets as a result of pervasive state ownership, privilege, cronyism, and 
discrimination.”178 Of course, the U.S. has not failed in all respects when 
promoting competition policy ideas. The use of leniency programs by 
competition agencies worldwide in their efforts to detect cartels, and the 
punishment of cartels by sanctions of “felony” rather than “misdemeanor” 
intensity, seem to be quite successful U.S. exports,179 even though the criminal 
law gambit for cartel conduct remains immature or embryonic in most 
“importing” jurisdictions due to institutional impediments and/or reasons of 
culture.180 Another idea that the U.S. has pushed with some success (in Europe 
and elsewhere) is that, as alluded to above, outside of hard core categories of 
 
178. Crane, supra note 176, at 3. With regard to the way U.S. antitrust is perceived from the outside, see 
GERBER, supra note 4, at 204 (“US experience has long been at the center of the competition law story, but the 
path of US antitrust law development and the set of issues included within it appear narrow from a global 
perspective. In comparison with European experience and issues, they often have limited relevance to decision 
makers in other countries and to the issues of global competition law development that many others consider 
important.”). Further discussion is provided in id. at 160-161 (pointing to factors that make the EU experience 
resonate more with numerous other jurisdictions, including, for example: the history of state ownership and 
privilege mentioned by Fox; the use of competition law to oppose excessive economic power; Europe’s civil 
law tradition and its clearer dividing line between public and private law institutions; and the role competition 
law has played in Europe’s process of political and economic integration). 
179. It has been explained that beginning in the 1990s and roughly through 2001, while the U.S. 
succeeded in stirring up worldwide interest in the fight against cartels and secured at the OECD a 1998 Council 
Recommendation against “hard core” cartels, the substantive areas to which the European Community had been 
seeking to draw attention—abuse of dominance and vertical restraints—faded into the background. See Fox, 
Linked-In, supra note 49, at 156-157. In footnote 17 of her article, Fox describes this turn of events as a U.S. 
“victory.” If this process is seen as a global struggle, one might also say that it reflected externally Europe’s 
introspective modernization experience in the 1990s. That is to say, seeds had already been sown which 
eventually led the European Commission to reassess priorities internally and to devote far more attention to 
hard core cartels than to vertical restraints. Arguably, this means that the victory dynamic to which Fox refers 
partly manifested itself earlier, not so much in the global antitrust discourse but in complex diffusion elements 
that more directly concerned the interplay between U.S. and EEC/EC antitrust (which cannot be explained 
adequately in the context of this essay). The story with regard to abuse of dominance problems is somewhat 
more complicated, and this is where the victory is arguably most apparent, as non-interventionism in this regard 
probably did not reflect the preferences of the EC/EU even taking account of its internal evolution and 
investigations. 
180. See Harry First, Your Money and Your Life: The Export of U.S. Antitrust Remedies, in COMPETITION 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 167 (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013) (discussing institutional variations in criminal 
penalties in a sample of 13 jurisdictions and noting that, with exceptions, few price fixers really go to jail 
outside the U.S.); Donald Baker, Trying to Use Criminal Law and Incarceration to Punish Participants and 
Deter Cartels Raises Some Broad Political and Social Questions in Europe, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
ANNUAL 2011: INTEGRATING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW—IMPLICATIONS FOR 
COURTS AND AGENCIES 41 (Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2014) (questioning the cultural ripeness of 
criminal sanctions in the European context and suggesting a variety of alternative administrative tools that could 
be used as substitutes to achieve deterrence objectives). 
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irredeemable conduct—horizontal price fixing, market sharing, bidrigging and 
the like—competition problems should be resolved only after an assessment of 
their competitive effects has been conducted.181 Nevertheless, by and large the 
picture presented by Crane and Fox rings true: the EU-oriented ideas of open 
market maintenance and faith in prophylactic market intervention by public 
institutions have been broadly accepted worldwide; the Chicago model has in 
general been studied more for its pitfalls than for its accuracy and 
appropriateness. Lest we leave the impression that the EU paradigm is a 
universally irresistible model, however, it may be added that many developing 
countries are searching for a competition policy that goes beyond that of the EU. 
The overriding imperative for these countries is economic development. 
Competition law is often seen as a tool of development policy insofar as having 
such a law in place can support growth,182 and of wealth redistribution insofar as 
it can ameliorate inequitable wealth transfers and distortions associated with 
 
181. This idea was actively promoted to undercut a tradition of competition law enforcement in the 
European (Economic) Community whereby many competition problems could be solved on the basis of 
categorical reasoning. For example, it was often assumed by EEC/EC enforcers that if restrictions in a vertical 
agreement were designed to provide territorial protection for a distributor, the agreement was ipso facto inimical 
to the ideal of market integration, and fell necessarily to be condemned irrespective of possible countervailing 
effects—an insufficiently nuanced view. In the field of unilateral conduct by a firm with a dominant market 
position, it was traditionally believed (and may still be believed by the EU Courts—a matter to be revealed 
when a pending controversy reaches final judgment) that conditional sales discounts that create fidelity on the 
part of customers were ipso facto inimical to the “competitive process,” and that there was no need to delve 
further into the presence/absence of anticompetitive distortions or efficiency effects. Fox & Crane, supra note 
178. 
182. It seems clear that a functioning competition law regime is not, strictly speaking and all else equal, a 
necessary condition for economic growth. See, e.g., Thomas Ulen, The Uneasy Case for Competition Law and 
Regulation as Decisive Factors in Development: Some Lessons for China, in COMPETITION POLICY AND 
REGULATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, THE US AND EUROPE 13 (Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang 
eds., 2011); Aditya Bhattacharjea, Who Needs Antitrust? Or, is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A 
Historical-Comparative Analysis, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 52, 58-59 (D. Daniel Sokol et al. 
eds., 2013). (The possibility of growth absent effective competition law, at least where conditions are ripe, is 
not confined to Asia. To cite just two examples: the U.S. economy grew at a rate of around 7% from 1869 to 
1879; and the Italian economy grew at rates of 6% to 8% between the late 1950s and the late 1960s, thus 
ramping up essentially before the EEC competition law system could even partially compensate for the lack of a 
genuine Italian competition law.) Nevertheless, several studies have indicated a positive correlation between 
effective enforcement of competition laws in developing countries and increased economic growth. See, e.g., 
John Preston, Investment Climate Reform Competition Policy and Economic Development: Some Country 
Experiences, Case Study Commissioned for the U.K. Dept. of Int’l Dev. (2003), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/477365-1327693758977/8397896-1327771331430/ 
dfid_preston_10.pdf (noting the need for more country-specific analysis); Fox & Gal, supra note 12, at 2-3, 
with references. And empirical research seems to confirm that sectors marked by competitive pressures tend to 
exhibit greater relative productivity. See e.g., Mateus, supra note 31, at 117-118, with references. It may 
therefore be unsurprising that, when other growth models, such as Chalmers Johnson’s “developmental state” 
model, reach a point of exhaustion and diminishing returns, a government may consider a stronger commitment 
to competition, and a corresponding shift away from excessive intervention or discriminatory industrial policy, 
as essential factors contributing to productivity and growth or at least buffering against the possibility of worse 
conditions. Cf. Marquis & Shiraishi, supra note 34. In this sense, discussions of whether a functioning 
competition law regime is a necessary condition of growth should consider the prospects of sustained growth 
and should take account of a country’s medium-term and long-term economic evolution. 
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(possibly state-supported) market power.183 The question of how to integrate 
development and social inclusion objectives (which may be commingled with 
cultural specificities as well) within a competition law framework is thus in many 
parts of the world an issue of immediacy and prime importance.184 
4. Widening of the Geographic Field and of the Competitive Parameters 
The implicit contest between U.S.-born and E.U.-born ideas does not exhaust 
the competitive field in this context. The impulse to develop and advocate 
competition-related ideas and concepts is also felt in other discrete jurisdictions. 
Examples of such jurisdictions can be mentioned only briefly here, but one of 
them is the United Kingdom.185 The now-retired Office of Fair Trading (OFT) for 
many years sought to provide intellectual leadership via its unusually prolific 
publication of studies, surveys and introspective initiatives on a variety of 
subjects.186 The OFT’s efforts had a persuasive impact in foreign quarters,187 and 
 
183. One notable version of this perspective is that (notwithstanding the caveat of the previous footnote) 
effective competition law promotes functional markets, and well-functioning markets are essential to 
developing countries because of their intertwined instrumental and ethical characteristics. Markets produce 
wealth necessary for economic development and for the protection of human rights, each of which are necessary 
conditions for self-actualization and socioeconomic mobility; and they constitute (on both the supply and 
demand side) a social institution wherein, provided the possibility of participation is assured, personal freedom 
can flourish. See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985) (discussing opportunities 
(capabilities) as an alternative measure of well-being); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 4-6 (1999) 
(also cited in several recent studies such as: Robert D. Anderson & Anna Caroline Müller, Competition and 
Poverty Reduction: A Holistic Approach, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-02 (Feb. 20, 2013), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201302_e.pdf); Bhattacharjea, supra note 182, at 63; D. Daniel 
Sokol, Thomas Cheng and Ioannis Lianos, Introduction, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 5 (D. 
Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013). As the latter authors state: “If one were to subscribe to the freedom-based 
approach to economic development [. . .], one might need to incorporate in competition law analysis special 
considerations about the impact of competitive behavior on the poor’s access to education, health care, and 
other essentials in life.” Id. This could be done, perhaps controversially, at a micro level in individual cases, but 
at a minimum and more importantly it could be done as a matter of policy planning, prioritization, advocacy and 
joint international efforts. See also Anderson and Müller, supra; Bhattacharjea, supra note 182, at 62-65; Zsofia 
Tari & Jeremy West, Background Note, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND 
POVERTY REDUCTION 1, DAF/COMP/GF(2013)1 (2013)). In any case, once again, a long-term and optimistic 
perspective would suggest that the role of equity-based redistributive concepts incorporated within competition 
policy as a means to address extreme socioeconomic inequality (and hence extreme political inequality) can be 
re-evaluated at a later point in time—particularly as applied, if at all, at the micro level—if a developing country 
“graduates” to middle income status with tolerable levels of wealth distribution and mobility. 
184. See Mor Bakhoum, A Dual Language in Modern Competition Law? “Efficiency Approach” versus 
“Development Approach” and Implications for Developing Countries, 34 WORLD COMPETITION 495 (2011) 
(advocating a hybrid concept of “efficient development”); see also Dina Waked, Competition Law in the 
Developing World: The Why and How of Adoption and its Implications for International Competition Law, 1 
GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 69, 82-84 (2008). 
185. See, e.g., William Kovacic, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY—
THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER PRACTICES (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_statements/federal-trade-commission-100-our-second-century/ftc100rpt.pdf. 
186. One may just cite here a small sample of these internally and externally prepared studies, with the 
following titles: The Impact of Reverse-Fixed Payments on Competition; The Economics of Secondary Product 
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were likely intended, in part, to have that effect. It will not be surprising if the 
new Competition and Markets Authority follows this pattern. Another example 
of a competition authority staking a claim for itself by providing intellectual 
leadership and thereby “punching above its weight,” to use this phrase again, is 
the Swedish Competition Authority (i.e., the Konkurrensverket). For the last 
decade the Swedish authority has been hosting annual conferences with noted 
experts (“the pros and cons of X practice”) and publishing the proceedings.188 
In a different vein but still in relation to the power of ideas, and with a clear 
connection to the contrasting “systems of belief” marking U.S. antitrust and EU 
competition law, one may also refer to the alternative conceptions and objectives 
of the defense of competition in jurisdictions worldwide. A notable example in 
this regard is South Africa, where the idea of competition law cannot be confined 
exclusively to concepts such as economic efficiency, well-functioning markets, 
or the freedom to compete, among others.189 In South Africa antitrust has been 
partly conceived of as contributing to a post-Apartheid form of economic 
democratization, to borrow a phrase normally used in discussions of certain 
Asian countries.190 Concerns relating to employment impacts, Black Economic 
Empowerment, and more generally protection of the public interest partly define 
its distinctive “goal structure,”191 and understandably so. Apart from the terms of 
the law, the decision-making of the South African Competition Tribunal has been 
praised for being “specifically tailored to the goal of inclusive development.”192 
In short, and although the appellate courts have occasionally rejected the 
 
Markets; Competition and Growth; Consumer Behavioural Biases in Competition; The Competition Impact of 
Environmental Product Standards; The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups. See id. at 79-80. 
187. For example, the OFT’s work on prioritization of agency activities and the resulting report issued in 
2008 attracted the interest of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. See id. at 88-89, 116 (reviewing the 
approaches of several other authorities as well; it is not suggested here that the OFT was uniquely influential). 
188. Since 2002, the Konkurrensverket has hosted Pros and Cons conferences covering a variety of 
competition-related subjects including consumer protection, standard setting, vertical restraints, high prices, low 
prices, information sharing, the pros and cons of merger control, and more pros and cons of merger control. See 
Arvid Fredenberg, Ten Years of Pros and Cons Conferences, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (August 2012 (1)). 
189. See, e.g., Bakhoum, supra note 184 at 495. 
190. The South African version of economic democratization is described in part by Lewis, supra note 
29, at 233 (Robust antitrust was to be an instrument “whereby the economic kingdom would be conquered by 
the post-apartheid rulers. [. . .] [C]oncentrated markets and centralized ownership structures, and the powerful 
interest groups that they supported, were going to be fragmented.”). A Kenyan perspective on the idea of 
economic democracy to parallel political democracy is referenced in the speech of Uhuru Kenyatta. Kenyatta, 
supra note 56. 
191. See, e.g., Trudi Hartzenberg, Competition Policy and Enterprise Development: the Role of Public 
Interests in South Africa’s Competition Policy, in COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES AND COMPETITION POLICY IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 136 (Paul Cook, Raul Fabella & Cassey Lee eds., 2007) (discussing the public interest 
objectives in the South African context). The reference in the main text to “goal structures” is borrowed from 
David Gerber, The Future of Article 82: Dissecting the Conflict, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 
2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 37, 110 (Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2008). 
192. Fox, supra note 12, at 284. Moreover, competition law has been used in South Africa (by the 
Competition Commission) to remedy what may also have been a failure of public health policy, in particular in 
the context of the pharmaceutical sector and medicines for HIV patients. See Monti, supra note 11, at 364. 
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purposive statutory interpretations of the Tribunal,193 South Africa has produced a 
novel, culturally attuned philosophy of competition law.194 The model may not 
travel well to other social settings that lack a history or present reality of extreme 
economic inequality and/or caste-like social strata analogous to those that have 
afflicted South Africa. Yet the idea that competition policy can be a tool to 
destabilize entrenched social structures, promote socioeconomic mobility and 
alleviate poverty may resonate in a large number of countries.195 David Lewis 
argues, moreover, that a competition authority can be well-positioned to balance 
between competition issues, such as market power and efficiency, and seemingly 
incommensurable public interest issues such as employment impacts and small 
business concerns.196 If a country follows in the footsteps of the South African 
legislator and competition authorities, it should however also plan for the 
accumulation of the necessary political capital and coalition partners, and ensure 
that it has the necessary legal mechanisms, to add to its portfolio the contestation 
and dismantling of unjustified state-imposed restrictions of competition.197 
Further, the authority entrusted to balance competition and non-competition 
 
193. See Janice Bleazard, Pigeon-Holed by Precedent: Form Versus Substance in the Application of 
South African Competition Law, in BUILDING NEW COMPETITION REGIMES 81 (David Lewis ed., 2013). 
194. See Dennis Davis & Lara Granville, South Africa: The Competition Law System and the Country’s 
Norms, in DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS 266 (Eleanor Fox & Michael Trebilcock eds., 2013) 
(providing a fuller picture of competition law in South Africa and of the problems facing it). 
195. The links between competition policy on the one hand and poverty reduction, inclusiveness and 
mobility on the other have stirred great interest. For example, the African Competition Forum states that its 
principal objective is “to promote the adoption of competition principles in the implementation of national and 
regional economic policies of African countries, in order to alleviate poverty and enhance inclusive economic 
growth, development and consumer welfare by fostering competition in markets, and thereby increasing 
investment, productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship.” Press Release, African Competition Forum, African 
Competition Forum launched in Nairobi (Mar. 8, 2011). According to researchers at the OECD, the links 
between competition policy and poverty, and the possible ameliorative effects of competition policy, require 
further empirical research; in the meantime, competition authorities should prioritize their work taking into 
account impact on the poor (e.g., by focusing on essential goods and services, banking and communications), 
and they should actively engage in advocacy to encourage market-based policies and to counter-balance vested 
interests. See Tari and West, supra note 183; See also Anderson and Müller, supra note 183. 
196. See David Lewis, Contribution to the Global Forum on Competition (Competition and Poverty 
Reduction), DAF/COMP/GF(2013)3 (2013) at 7-11, available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/ 
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(2013)3&docLanguage=En. In the context of the EU, the 
European Commission sometimes acts, theoretically under the control of the EU Courts, as mediator of a range 
of interests unconfined to competition concerns strictly defined. See Monti, supra note 21, at 15-16 (citing 
Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, 2 EUR. 
UNION POLITICS 103 (2001) (defining Commission as a “trustee” rather than merely an agent, and as a part 
owner of the policies for which it is responsible). With specific regard to Article 101(3) TFEU, whose breadth 
continues to provoke debate, the Commission’s role as mediator of interests raises questions as to how to define 
the role national courts and agencies ought to play when applying that provision (or when applying EU 
competition law generally). Different solutions could have different consequences for the principle of the 
uniform application of EU law. See WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 136, at 159-160 (presenting, briefly, this set 
of dilemmas). 
197. See Lewis, supra note 29. 
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concerns should be prepared for the possibility that such a mandate might attract 
ad hoc attempts by government officials to influence that balance.198 
As yet another example in the context of alternative visions of competition 
policy goals one may also mention China. In the People’s Republic, competition 
law is now presented as an integral part of the socialist market economy and 
serves, in tandem with (albeit in conflict with) industrial policy as an instrument 
of State-led capitalism.199 China’s competition law framework (which must be 
considered together with the country’s institutional features, including a highly 
specific judiciary200) has borrowed some genetic materials from the EU model but 
it is in its present state a far cry from its cousin and bears only a slight 
resemblance. Chinese competition law presents yet another model from which to 
“choose”—potentially a rather appealing one for countries not ready to cut their 
economies free from the umbilical cord of the State—or for countries with 
changing preferences wishing to restore a close connection that has been lost. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article emerges from preparations for a workshop focusing on the 
transnational circulation of policy paradigms wherein the case study chosen was 
the field of competition law. The argument presented in the foregoing text is that 
policy paradigms in this context are actively pushed and pulled according to 
forces analogous to those of the market, and that policy entrepreneurs (typically 
competition law agencies) operate in a setting where—notwithstanding various 
cooperative platforms—competition and rivalry occur and manifest themselves 
along a number of dimensions. An important premise of the article is thus the 
notion advanced by other scholars that competition enforcers across jurisdictions 
compete among themselves on a global market. Building on that premise, an 
attempt has been made to elaborate on certain arenas or “modes” through which 
such competitive behavior is pursued. With the multiplication of antitrust 
jurisdictions around the world, which may act simultaneously as both “sellers” 
and “buyers,” new competitive opportunities may likewise emerge. While the 
article has not dwelled upon the normative desirability of global “yardstick” 
competition among rival agencies, the alternative would promise little if any 
 
198. See id. at 243 (describing intrusions by a senior official of the South African Department of Trade 
and Industry). 
199. See e.g., Mel Marquis, Abuse of Administrative Power to Restrict Competition in China: Four 
Reflections, Two Ideas and a Thought, in THE CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 73, 87-88 (Michael Faure & 
Xinzhu Zhang eds., 2013) (discussing the concept of the socialist market economy). 
200. Recently and encouragingly, some efforts have been made at the level of the central government to 
rein in the habitual interference with the judicial process by local officials. See e.g., Keith Zhai, Courts See Less 
Cadre Meddling in Judgments, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, December 13, 2013, at A6. However, judicial 
independence in China is bound to remain merely relative in nature. There is little doubt that the judicial 
process will remain subject to intervention in politically sensitive disputes, whether the intervention is 
surreptitious and unapproved by the political hierarchy or whether it is done by order from above. 
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dynamism, adaptability or motivation for innovation and agency self-
improvement. 
 
